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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Attorney and Client-Divorce-Effect of Reconciliation
upon Attorney's Fees.
A wife instituted a suit for divorce and applied for temporary
alimony and expenses of litigation. Before a hearing could be had, the
wife's attorneys announced to the court her request that the suit be

dismissed, and asked to be allowed to continue the action in their own
behalf for the recovery of attorneys' fees. The trial court left the suit
pending, and after a hearing on the question of fees, made an allowance.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia this judgment was reversed as being
an abuse of the trial judge's discretion in that such a procedure enabled
the attorneys to parade the grievances of the parties before the court

against their will.1 The statutes of Georgia place the -power of granting2
temporary alimony, including counsel fees, in the discretion of the court.
1 Williams v. Williams, 4 S. E. (2d) 195 (Ga. 1939).
2 GA. CODE (Michie, 1933) §§2976, 2977, 2979.
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The right of the wife, in a divorce action, to have her husband pay
3
counsel fees usually depends upon the discretion of the trial court.
Formerly, when the ownership of a separate estate by the wife was more
limited, the request by the wife that her husband pay the fees was
granted more or less as a matter of course; but now, enabling statutes
have changed the situation so that the court must make a more thorough
investigation in exercising its discretion. 4 The wife, when plaintiff, is
entitled to a reasonable allowance for counsel fees, which are included
in alimony pendente lite, if she is without funds and her husband has
sufficient means to stand the expense.5 However, a prima facie case
for divorce must be established and good faith shown." The counsel
fees are ordered to be paid to the wife as alimony and not to the counsel,
although the order may be to the wife for the benefit of the attorney
7
named.
On the question of the privilege of an attorney for the wife, as
plaintiff in a divorce action, to intervene for his fees, and thereby prevent the dismissal requested by the parties after they have become reconciled, the cases are in conflict. The public policy argument of the
case under discussion is the principal one advanced in favor of denying
the privilege of the attorney to continue the action. Other arguments
are based on the legal effect of a reconciliation and on the nature of
the award of counsel fees. Courts favoring the attorney's action attach
greater importance to the relief of the attorney and to a different interpretation of the effect of a reconciliation.
The power to keep the suit open has been denied on the ground of
public policy because it would have a tendency to break up the reconciliation s and to allow the personal relations of the husband and wife
to be paraded before the court after the parties had forgiven each other
for past offences. 9 For these same reasons, a reconciliation has been
13

SCHOULER,

MARRIAGE,

(6th ed. 1921) 1958.

DIVORCE,

SEPARATION,

AND

DOMESTIC RELATIONS

In North Carolina, the right to temporary alimony and

counsel fees is a question of law, while the amount is a matter of judicial discretion. Davidson v. Davidson, 189 N. C. 625, 127 S. E. 682 (1925).
'See Bailey v. Bailey, 22 N. D. 553, 556, 134 N. W. 747, 749 (1912).
'Note (1909) 8 MIcH. L. Rxv. 155.
'Tidd, Wizen Should Alimony Pendente Life be Allowed (1912) 55 CENT.
L. J. 383.
Kowalsky v. Kowalsky, 145 Cal. 394, 78 Pac. 877 (1904); Garrison v. Garrison, 150 Ind. 417, 50 N. E. 383 (1898) ; Blakely v. Blakely, 117 Minn. 482, 136

N. W. 3 (1912). The weight of authority is said to be that orders made payable
directly to the attorney are void, although some courts say that this is merely
irregular. See Bailey v. Bailey, 22 N. D. 553, 557, 134 N. W. 747, 749 (1912).
' Bell v. Bell, 214 Ala. 573, 108 So. 375 (1926) ; Overstreet v. Overstreet, 144

Ga. 294, 87 S. E. 27 (1915); Jones v. Jones, 97 S. W. (2d) 949 (Tex. Comm.

App. 1936).
9 Dicken v. Dicken, 38 Ga. 663 (1869) ; Hill v. Hill, 47 Ga. 332 (1872) ; Small

v. Small, 42 Iowa 111 (1875); Litowich v. Litowich, 19 Kan. 451 (1878).
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held to preclude any later award of fees even where the motion for
fees was made before the request for dismissal. 10 This is because the
court, in determining whether the wife had established a prima fade
case for divorce and was acting in good faith, may inquire as to the
pecuniary and social condition of both parties, their habits of living and
previous conduct, and all circumstances affecting the complaint in the
divorce case.'
The theory of these cases, therefore, is that the raking
over of those troubles which the parties wish to forgive and forget is
not justified by the desirability of seeing that counsel fees are paid.
As a practical matter, this view has its merits. Such an investigation
and the resulting order on the husband might again revive the controversy, anger the husband, and result in another divorce action. The
publicity that such an investigation might receive is also to be considered, even though it might occur only in unusual cases. On the other
hand, if the attorney is denied the privilege, in the divorce action, to
compel the reconciled husband to pay him his fees, an attorney may
refuse to use his influence to reconcile other -parties until he has an order
awarding him his fees. By that time the action may have proceeded
so far that reconciliation will be more difficult.
Other courts have held that when the wife requests a dismissal,
jurisdiction to make any orders with respect to counsel fees is lost, because an allowance must be made to the wife, and she has no further
cause of action.' 2 But should not the court have jurisdiction of the
matter until an order of dismissal is made by the court itself? It has
also been held that the fact that attorney's fees are allowable to the wife
for prospective services of an attorney forbids the granting of an application for fees at the time of dismissal for the reason that the award
cannot be made for past services.' 3 These courts take the attitude that
if the wife has proceeded thus far with the action, she does not need an
award of the court granting her an allowance for that which she has
already done. They do not seem to realize that the services of the
attorney may have been rendered in expectation of an award of fees
" Kuntz v. Kuntz, 80 N. J. Eq. 429, 83 Atl. 787 (Ch. 1912) (suit for separate
maintenance) ; Chase v. Chase, 29 Hun 527 (N. Y. 1883).

" Keefer v. Keefer, 140 Ga. 18, 78 S. E. 462 (1913) ; McCulloch v. Murphy,
45 Ill.
256 (1867) ; Petersen v. Petersen, 76 Neb. 282, 107 N. W. 391 (1906).
"2 Reynolds v. Reynolds, 67 Cal. 176, 7 Pac. 480 (1885); Ludin v. Ludin, 28
Hawaii 487 (1925); Dallas v. Dallas, 222 Iowa 42, 268 N. W. 516 (1936); Carden
v. Carden, 37 S. W. 1022 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1896).
" Lacey v. Lacey, 108 Cal. 45, 40 Pac. 1056 (1895) ; McCarthy v. McCarthy,
137 N. Y. 500, 33 N. E. 550 (1893) (Statute provides that court could make order
for attorney's fees "during pendency of action" and "when necessary to enable

wife to carry on the action." The court said awards for past services were
"not necessary to enable wife to carry on the action".) ; Conklin v. Conklin, 201
App. Div. 170, 194 N. Y. Supp. 685 (3d Dep't 1922); Holt v. Carr, 170 Misc.
32, 9 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 818 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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at a later date. Of course, the courts adopting these views hold that
when the application for fees is made after the case has been dismissed,
14
an order allowing such fees from the husband cannot then be made.
There are jurisdictions, however, which allow the action to be continued, even after the parties have become reconciled and have asked
for a dismissal, to permit attorney's fees to be adjudged, and, if allowed,
collected from the husband. These courts do not discuss the public
policy viewpoint, but maintain that it is contrary to the principles of
honesty and equity for the attorney not to be .paid.15 However, there
would be cases where the wife would not be entitled to counsel fees
at all. Then, the danger of rekindling the flame would be undergone
with no benefit to the attorney.
When there has been a reconciliation without a request for a dismissal, it is held that the reconciliation is not the legal equivalent of a
dismissal, and the court may make an order directing the payment of
attorney's fees.1 6 A Kentucky court allowed an attorney to make a
motion for his fees even after the suit had been dismissed, and permitted a recovery from the husband.' 7 This court maintained that the
reconciliation and dismissal of the action did not relieve the husband of
his liability for the fee of his wife's attorney.
If the order for the payment of fees has been made before the reconciliation and dismissal of the suit, the husband is required to pay.18
In such a situation, the testimony concerning the grounds for divorce
and the determination of and order for fees has already taken place
before the reconciliation occurs and, therefore, would not have a tendency to break up the reunion of the parties.
There are a number of states, including Georgia, which hold that
the attorney may recover from the husband in an independent action
at law. The basis of such decisions is that attorney's fees are one of
"4Welborn v. Welborn, 47 Fla. 348, 36 So. 61 (1904) ; Sims v. Davis, 48 Neb.
720, 67 N. W. 765 (1896) ; Thompson v. Thompson, 3 Head 527 (Tenn. 1859).
" Taylor v. Taylor, 33 Idaho 445, 196 Pac. 211 (1921) (Statute giving attorney a lien on the cause of action was held to govern this case) ; Courtney v.
Courtney, 4 Ind. App. 221, 30 N. E. 914 (1892) ; Burgess v. Burgess, 62 Ky. 287
(1864); Green v. Green, 40 How. Pr. (N. Y. 1870); Sumner v. Sumner, 54 Wis.
642, 12 N. W. 21 (1882).
1" Beaulieu v. Beaulieu,
114 Minn. 511, 131 N. W. 481 (1911); Fullhart v.
Fullhart, 109 Mo. App. 705, 83 S. W. 541 (1904) ; Kiddle v. Kiddle, 90 Neb. 248,
133 N. W. 181 (1911).
" Powell v. Lilly, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 193, 68 S. W. 123 (1902).
"Weaver v. Weaver, 33 Ga. 172 (1862); Aspinwall v. Sabin, 22 Neb. 73, 34
N. W. 72 (1887) (found settlement fraudulent as to attorney) ; Yoder v. Yoder,
105 Wash. 491, 178 -Pac. 474 (1919) (action by husband against wife) ; see Bovard

v. Bovard, 128 S. W. (2d)' 274, 276 (Mo. App. 1939).

Cf. Johnson v. Gerald,

216 Ala. 581, 113 So. 447 (1927) ; Quinn v. Quinn, 133 Misc. 266, 231 N. Y. Supp.

329 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
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the "necessaries" for which the wife can pledge her husband's credit.'"
The recovery in such a suit is for the reasonable value of the services
rendered and not for the contract price.2 0 The Texas rule is that the
attorney must show that both he and his client acted in good faith and
with probable cause, 2 ' whereas Iowa requires the attorney to show that
the prosecution of the divorce suit was necessary for the -protection of
the wife.22 However, the majority of the states do not permit a re23
covery by the attorney from the husband in an independent action, it
being said, with regard to the idea of counsel fees as "necessaries",
that "necessaries" are such as to provide for the wife as such and not
for her future condition as a single woman.2 4

There remains to be considered, as the last alternative of the attorney, an independent action against the wife. It has been indicated
that such an action may be instituted, 25 but the wife is usually without
means, this being the reason she has requested counsel fees. Therefore, a recovery against the wife by the attorney in a separate suit would
be of little avail.
The decisions of the Georgia court are inconsistent. While the
attorney is denied the right to continue the divorce action to recover
his fees, he may bring an independent action at law in that jurisdiction.2 6 It would seem that -practically the same considerations of public
policy would impel the denial of the right to bring an independent suit,
for the testimony as to the ground for divorce introduced in the separate
action would be of the same character as that which prompted the court
" Sprayberry v. Merk, 30 Ga. 81 (1860) ; Maddy v. Prevulsky, 178 Iowa 1091,

160 N. W. 762 (1917); Gossett v. Patten, 23 Kan. 340 (1880)

(husband had

sued wife for divorce) ; Tullis v. Calhoun, 184 La. 207, 165 So. 714 (1936) ; Bord
v. Stubbs, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 242, 54 S. W. 633 (1899); Hicks v. Stewart, 53
Tex. Civ. App. 401, 118 S. W. 206 (1909) ; see Parks v. Parks, 126 Ga. 437, 438,

55 S.E. 176 (1906).

.0 Sprayberry v. Merk, 30 Ga. 81 (1860) ; Benton v. Losavio, 176 So. 676 (La.
App. 1937).
21 Neblett v. Goukas, 40 S. W. (2d) 1113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
2
Wick v. Beck, 171 Iowa 115, 153 N. W. 836 (1915).
Kincheloe v. Merriman, 54 Ark. 557, 16 S. W. 578 (1891); Meaher v.
Mitchell, 112 Me. 416, 92 AtI. 492 (1914) ; Coffin v. Dunham, 8 Cush. 404 (Mass.
1851) ; Grimstad v. Johnson, 61 Mont. 18, 201 Pac. 314 (1921) ; Ray v. Adden,
50 N. H. 82 (1870); Humphries v. Cooper, 55 Wash. 376, 104 Pac. 606 (1909) ;
Clarke v. Burke, 65 Wis. 359, 27 N. W. 22 (1886). The New York rule allows
an action to be maintained for services rendered in a separation proceeding in
certain cases, but not in an action for absolute divorce. Hays v. Ledman, 28 Misc.
575, 59 N. Y. Supp. 687 (Sup. Ct. 1899).
2' Grimstad v. Johnson, 61 Mont. 18, 201 Pac. 314 (1921); Kuntz v. Kuntz,
80 N. J. Eq. 429, 83 AtI. 787 (Ch. 1912).
" Humphries v. Cooper, 55 Wash. 376, 104 Pac. 606 (1909); see Keefer v.
Keefer, 140 Ga. 18, 26, 78 S. E. 462, 465 (1913) ; Ludin v. Ludin, 28 Hawaii 487,
492 (1925).
26 Sprayberry v. Merk, 30 Ga. 81 (1860); see Parks v. Parks, 126 Ga. 437,
438, 55 S. E. 176 (1906); Keefer v. Keefer, 140 Ga. 18, 26, 78 S. E. 462, 465
(1913).
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to forbid the attorney to continue the divorce action. Where such an independent action is permitted, the court should determine the fees in the
original divorce action, thus avoiding multiplicity of suits.
North Carolina has not passed on the exact question presented in
the instant case nor on the right of an attorney to bring an independent
action.2 7 There seems to be no solution which would obviate the
danger of undoing the reconciliation and at the same time permit the
attorney to collect his fees from the husband.
W. 0. COOKE.
Conflict of Laws-Bigamy-Validity of Foreign Marriages.
On appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission of Virginia
denying the claim of the appellent for compensation for the death of
her alleged husband, it appeared that the claimant was formerly married
in West Virginia to one J. M. Lawson, from whom she subsequently
separated. Four years later, believing in good faith that her husband
was dead, she married the deceased, still in West Virginia, and that same
year they came to Virginia where the fatal accident occurred. Evidence
was presented at the hearing before the Commission to prove that the
claimant's first husband was still living. The court affirmed the decision
of the Commission on the ground that her status as lawful widow of
the deceased must be determined by the law of Virginia, which declared
such second marriage bigamous and void ab initio, rather than by the
law of West Virginia, where the marriage, although prohibited, would
be void only from the time it was so declared by a decree of nullity.1
With the natural abhorrence of all Christian nations for the crimes
of bigamy and polygamy, the Anglo-American courts have adhered
more or less closely to the famous English description of the marriage
status as being "the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman
to the exclusion of all others." 2 The effect of the crime of bigamy on
the marriage status is evidenced by a brief review of the applicable
principles of law. At common law, the civil disability of a prior undissolved marriage of one of the parties renders a subsequent marriage by
27 N.

1

C. CODE

ANN. (Michie,

1939) §1666.

Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp., 4 S. E. (2d) 364 (Va. 1939).
'Hyde v. Hyde & Woodmansee, L. R. I P. & D. 130, 133 (1866).
This
definition has been neceisarily qualified by the divorce laws of both England and
the United States. The English courts have adhered much more rigidly to this
view than have the American courts. Brook v. Brook, 9 I-E L. 193 (1861) ;In re
Bethell, 38 Ch. D. 220 (1887); Nachimson v. Nachimson, P. 217 (1930); cf.
Pourier v. McKinzie, 147 Fed. 287 (D. Mont. 1906) ; Wall v. Williamson, 8 Ala.
.48 (1845) ; Royal v. Cudahy Packing Co., 195 Iowa 759, 190 N. W. 427 (1922) ;
Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co., 76 Mich. 498, 43 N. W. 602 (1889) ; Johnson v.
Johnson's Adm'r, 30 Mo. 72 (1860); Kalyton v. Kalyton, 45 Ore. 116, 78 Pac.
332 (1904); Morgan v. McGhee, 5 Humph. 13 (Tenn. 1844).
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either party void ab initio, regardless of good faith.3 Most of the states
in this country have incorporated this common law doctrine into express
statutes. 4 Likewise, if the dissolution of the prior marriage is invalid, 5
or if remarriage occurs within a prohibitory period after divorce, 6 the
second marriage may be considered void. Where a marriage in fact has
been proved, there is a presumption that it is valid, though it may be
rebutted by proof of a prior legal marriage which continues to exist. 7
Nor at common law did the long absence of one of the parties give rise
to a presumption of death which would allow the other party to remarry.8 This situation has also been changed by statutes in the great
majority of the states, some of which give the injured spouse the benefit
of the good faith of his action and create a valid defense to a bigamy
action, 9 while statutes in other states give at least voidable status to the
second marriage.' 0
Virginia, in accord with the great majority of the states, has, by
statute, adopted the common law rule that a bigamous marriage contracted before the lapse of the statutory period giving rise to a presumption of death is void ab initio, regardless.of the good faith of the
parties; and the party contracting such a marriage is criminally liable
for bigamy." Although there is English authority' 2 to support the view
'Evatt v. Miller, 114 Ark. 84, 169 S. W. 817 (1914); Irving v. Irving, 152
Ga. 174, 108- S. E. 540 (1921); Duenser v. Supreme Council, 262 Ill. 475, 104
N. E. 801 (1914) ; Davis v. Green, 91 N. J. Eq. 17, 108 AtI. 772 (1919) ; MADDEN,
PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1931) §18; note L. R. A. 1916C 711.
"The following statutes embody provisions typical to most states: GA. CODE
(1933) §26-5601 et seq.; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2495; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 23 §12.
' Simmons v. Simmons, 19 F. (2d) 690 (App. D. C. 1927) ; State v. Westmoreland, 76 S. C. 145. 56 S. E. 673 (1906); Hilton v. Roylance, 25 Utah 129, 69
Pac. 660 (1902).
1 Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U. S. 216, 54 Sup. Ct. 684, 78 L. ed. 1219 (1934);
Rhodes v. Miller, 189 La. 288, 179 So. 430 (1938); Fisher v. Fisher, 250 N. Y.
313, 165 N. E. 460 (1929).
'Walker v. "Walker, 218 Ala. 16, 117 So. 472 (1927); Crysler v. Crysler,
330 Ill. 74, 161 N. E. 97 (1928); Turner v. Williams, 202 Mass. 500, 89 N. E.
110 (1909); Doertch v. Folwell Engineering Co., 252 Mich. 76, 233 N. W. 211
(1930); Bentley v. Frenger, 158 Wash. 683, 291 Pac. 1089 (1930); I BISHOP,
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (6th ed. 1881) §13; TIFFANY, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC
RELATIONS (2d ed. 1909) §28.
'Matter of Kutter, 79 Misc. 74, 139 N. Y. Supp. 639 (1913); 2 ScHOULER,
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DoMEsTic RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921) §1129;
Feit, The Enoch Arden: A Problem in Family Law (1937) 6 BROOKLYN L. REV.
423.
1ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) §3441; ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1937) c.
38 §75; MASS. ANN. LAWS (1933) c. 207 §17; MICH. CoMP. LAWS (1929) §16821;
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §4342; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 23, §12;
VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) §§4538, 4539; W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1937)
§6057.
1

*ARE. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) §3294; CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1937)
§282; N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW §7a; S. C. CODE (1932) §8568.
" VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) §§5087, 4538, 4539.
" Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. D. 168 (1889).
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that the commission of the crime of bigamy without mens res is not
against public policy, the Virginia legislature has shown strong disapproval of this view.13 These rules are declaratory of the rigid public
policy which refuses to recognize that a marriage status ever existed.
It is a stringent measure, but the wisdom of it is apparent as a means
of protection against the dire results which might otherwise result from
evasion of the law.
West Virginia, on the other hand, has taken a different stand on
the question. In Sledd v. State Compensation Commission,1 4 a domestic
case analogous to the principal case, the claimant was allowed recovery
under the Workman's Compensation Act for the death of her second
husband although it was assumed that her husband by a prior undissolved marriage was still living. The court held that such a marriage
was not void until it was declared so by a court decree, and, further,
that it could not be collaterally attacked after the death of one of the
parties. It must be assumed that West Virginia has as strong a distaste
for bigamy as have her sister states, yet, since the adoption of the Code
of 1868, it has been the policy of West Virginia not to declare such
marriages void until after a judicial decree of nullity.'r This radical
change from the common law rule has the effect of keeping the marriage status practically valid until such a decree is issued, although there
can be a prosecution for bigamy before issuance of this decree.' 0 It has
been said, however, that when the law so forbids a marriage, the parties
are deemed to be under the duty of making restitution by having the
marriage annulled as soon as they discover' it to be bigamous, and a
court of equity will take jurisdiction regardless of the "clean hands"
doctrine.' 7 The West Virginia Court strongly intimated 8 in the Sledd
case that the marriage could have been validly attacked in a direct
action before a court, though this right was denied in a collateral proceeding before an administrative body. The obvious purpose of this
rule is to insure a thorough judicial investigation of all the facts before
the marriage is declared void. This type of legislation expresses the
thoroughly justifiable policy of West Virginia in fostering the marriage
21 Ill W. Va. 509, 163 S. E. 12 (1932).
Stewart v. Vandervort, 34 W. Va. 524, 12 S. E. 736 (1890); Martin v.
Martin, 54 W. Va. 301, 46 S. E. 120 (1903) (incest is treated in the same
manner); Sledd v. State Compensation Comm., 111 W. Va. 509, 163 S. E. 12
(1932); W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1937) §4701.
16 See Sledd v. State Compensation Comm., 111 W. Va. 509, 510, 163 S. E. 12
"

1

See note 11, iupra.

(1932).
17

See Martin v. Martin, 54 W. Va. 302, 303, 46 S. E. 120 (1903) ; Emmerglick,

"Clean Hqnds" v. Public Policy in the Nullity of Bigamous Marriages (1932) 4
DAx. L. REv. 3.
"sSee Sledd v. State Compensation Comm., 111 W. Va. 509, 511, 163 S. E.
12, 13 (1932). But see Hastings v. Douglass, 249 Fed. 378, 379 (N. D. W. Va.

1918).
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status, in which the state is vitally interested, until the marriage is
proved, beyond all doubt, to be against the law and public policy of the
state and, therefore, void.19
The court in the instant case, however, is faced with a delicate problen in the consideration of a bigamous marriage contracted under the
laws of a foreign state, prohibited by the laws of both states, but with
different effects attaching thereto in each. It is necessary to make a
choice between the universal desire to make the marriage valid and, on
the other hand, the required observance of the strong public policy of
the forum. 20 There is little doubt that the most desirable result would
contemplate that a marriage ceremony would have everywhere the same
operative effect, and, with that in view, the general rule has been
adopted by Anglo-American courts that the validity of the marriage is
governed by the law of the place of celebration. 21 A recognized exception to this general rule is applicable when the foreign marriage
conflicts with a prohibitory statute or the expressed public policy of
the forum, as in the case of a polygamous or an incestuous marriage.
This exception is to be invoked only when recognition of the foreign
marriage would prejudice vital interests of the forum, and the extent
to which such interest may be affected will depend on the circumstances
of each case.22 However, there is no way to compel a state to give
effect to a foreign marriage since every sovereign state has the absolute
power, limited only by the Federal Constitution, to govern the status of
those people over whom it has jurisdiction. 23 Therefore, even granting
the validity of the marriage at the place of celebration, still the question
remains whether the law of the forum will predicate a status of marriage upon the relationship. It seems that the problem ultimately to be
determined is whether, under the circumstances presented to the court,
sound policy will demand that the forum apply as its conflict of laws
rule in this situation the same rule which it would apply to like situations of a purely domestic origin.
Admitting the power and privilege of Virginia to decide which law
it will apply as its own law in this new situation, it is suggested that the
court should, without assuming any facts, look more particularly to the
" Hall v. Baylous, 109 W. Va. 1, 153 S. E. 293 (1930) ; Sledd v. State Compensation Comm., 111 W. Va. 509, 163 S. E. 12 (1932).
20 Beale, Marriage and the Donticil (1931) 44 HARv. L. REV. 501.
" Great Northern Ry. v. Johnson, 254 Fed. 683 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918) ; Royal
v. Cudahy Packing Co., 195 Iowa 759, 190 N. W. 427 (1922); Commonwealth v.
Lane, 113 Mass. 458 (1873); 2 BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1935) §§666-669; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) §116; STORY,
COMMENTARIES

OF

ON CONFLICT OF LAWS

(3d ed. 1846) §110;

STUMBERG, CONFLICT

LAWS (1937) §255.
"2See note 21, supra.
" Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33

L. J. 457.

YALE

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

merits and circumstances of the case at bar. Following the general
rule, it has recognized the first marriage of the claimant as valid under
West Virginia law, the lex loci contractus, but it now refuses to look
to the law of that state as governing the validity of the second marriage.
The court gives no indication of having seriously weighed the position
of the parties at the time of the marriage with relation to their future
domicile. Nor did the court consider the possibility that the parties
had merely established their residence temporarily in Virginia, without
actually abandoning the West Virginia domicile. Under such circumstances it is submitted that, in spite of the public policy of the forum,
the court was not justified in proceeding to a decision without a consideration of all the possibilities of the case, and the effects which would,
in reality, result to their own citizens. Further, since the Virginia
statute 24 forbidding bigamous cohabitation within the state was admittedly designed to guard the state against acts of evasion by their own
citizens, it need not stand in the way of the adoption of the West Virginia domestic law in this case. Would not a decision more in accord
with the bona fide situation of the parties be reached by the adoption of
the domestic law of West Virginia, where the parties were married and
evidently intended to remain, there being no showing to the contrary,
as the applicable conflict of laws rule for this particular case? There
is no justifiable reason to pigeon-hole this unusual case into an existing
groove of decisions because of a policy designed to govern domestic
situations.
While the action which would be taken by a West Virginia court
presented with this same fact situation in reverse is entirely a matter
of conjecture, it is most probable that the general rule would be invoked to the effect that a marriage invalid at the place of celebration
is invalid everywhere. 25 Thus, we may justifiably assume that such a
marriage would be declared void, since it is doubtful if the policy of
that state would be distinctive enough to override the fact that the parties
were not married legally when they entered the state. It is submitted
that if the Virginia court had consistently followed this more logical
reasoning and refused to be blinded by the most obvious policy objection,
not only would a more uniform and equitable result have been reached
but a more tenable basis would have been laid for future cases involving
this conflict of laws problem.
MARGARET C. JOHNSON.
"VA.

CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) §4538.

"5Schaffer v. Krestovnikow, 88 N. J. Eq. 192, 102 Atl. 246 (1917) ; DeFur v.
DeFur, 156 Tenn. 643, 4 S. W. (2d) 341 (1928); 2 BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CoNFLIcT OF LAWS (1935) §670; TIFFANY, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS (2d

ed. 1909) §30.
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Contracts--Implied Conditions-How Far a Party or Parties Must

Go in an Endeavor to Secure the Sanction of a
Disinterested Third Party.
Under an option contract for the sale of a transportation business,
subject to the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission, plaintiff
exercised his option and, with the defendants, made an application to
the commission for approval. The application was refused because it
was not signed in accordance with the rules and regulations of that body.
Defendants refused to make further application in correct form, and
plaintiff brought suit to compel specific performance. Held,1 it was the
duty of the defendants at least to join in a proper application to the
commision in furtherance of the purpose of their contract.
Although there may be no express provision in a contract that either
party will seek the necessary sanction of some disinterested third party,
still there may be implied such a condition. Where the court concludes
that, either expressly or by implication, one or the other of the contracting parties has undertaken to endeavor to secure such sanction, or that
the parties have undertaken to co6perate in securing such sanction, the
question arises as to how far the party or parties so obligated must go
in such endeavor.
The principal case partially answers this question, for in the absence
of an express controlling provision the court held that there was an implied condition that the defendant make proper application.
In a North Dakota case, 2 plaintiff and defendant entered into a
written agreement whereby defendant gave plaintiff an option to purchase an electric distribution system. Plaintiff exercised the option,
paid the agreed purchase price, and received a bill of sale from defendant. Later, upon discovering that defendant had made the sale without
having obtained the authorization of the board of railroad commissioners, as required by the state public utilities act, and upon defendant's
refusal to apply for such authority, plaintiff instituted an action to compel defendant to make such an application. Held, although it is the
duty of the vendor to make application to the commissioners for authority to sell a public utility, when that is the only thing wanting to consummate the contract, the vendee under the contract is vested with
sufficient interest to make the application himself. The application of
this case to the problem lies in the inference by the court that the vendor
could be forced, by a decree of specific performance, to make the application if the vendee could not do so.
'Lennon v. Habit, 216 N. C. 141, 4 S. E. (2d) 339 (1939).
' Otter Tail Power Co. v. Clark, 59 N. D. 320, 229 N. W. 915 (1930).
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A Kentucky case 3 held that where a manufacturing company located
on defendant's railroad in consideration of defendant's agreement to
maintain a certain rate on fuel and raw material shipments, and a subsequent change in law made it unlawful for a foreign corporation to
operate a railroad in the state without first incorporating under the laws
of Kentucky, defendant was liable for a breach of contract when it
ceased to operate in the state, for, with some inconvenience, it could
have complied with the law and continued to operate the road. This
case appears to be an expansion of the principle set forth in the principal case, for here the implied condition to do everything necessary to
the performance of the contract was held to include the doing of acts
essential to performance which arose after the execution of the contractual agreement, and which could not possibly have been contemplated
,by the parties prior to the change in the law.
From a slightly different angle-comes a New York case 4 holding
that where a contract for the sale of a franchise contemplated the payment of an additional sum by the vendee if a legislative ratification of
the franchise were validated in the New York Court of Appeals within
five years, defendant was obligated under an implied covenant to exercise the franchise so that proceedings could be maintaified to test the
validity of such legislation, and that failure to do so was a breach of
contract for which defendant was answerable in damages. Thus, this
court's attitude suggests that defendant must do everything necessary
to enable the other party to determine the approval or disapproval of the
judiciary. 5
Of course, if either party has undertaken to secure the sanction, as
distinguished from endeavoring to secure it, then a different problem is
presented, and it might be held that nothing short of actually securing
the sanction would constitute performance. In a New York case. 6 which
appears to look in this direction, a building contract required the contractor to obtain a permit from the building department of the city for
the construction of the building. His plans first submitted to the department were apparently labeled unsatisfactory. In an action to
recover the first installment of the contract price, held, that no liability
under the contract accrued to defendant until plaintiff had filed plans
reasonably free from objection and acceptable to the building depart'Newport News & Mississippi Valley Co. V. McDonald Brick Co.'s Assignee,
109 Ky. 408, 59 S. W. 332 (1900).
'Creamer v. Metropolitan Securities Co., 120 App. Div. 422, 105 N. Y. Supp.
28 (2d Dep't 1907).
5 Query: Would the result have been the same if the exercise of the franchise

were a punishable offense?
'Strom v. Dongon, 31 Misc. 754, 64 N. Y. Supp. 57 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
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ment, as the filing of acceptable plans was a prerequisite to the obtaining
of a building permit.
Plainly, if a party is bound to endeavor to secure the sanction, he
cannot enforce the contract until he has done so. Further, failure to
do so will render that party liable for damages or, in a proper case,
specific performance may be compelled. Where either or both parties
are bound only to endeavor to procure sanction, and do so endeavor,
but are unsuccessful, then if the performance of the contract depends
on the success of the endeavor, the contract should simply fail, and
neither party be allowed to enforce it.
Somewhat analogous to this problem are the cases where a promise
is made to pay out of a specified fund, not yet in existence. We find
that the courts in those cases inquire whether the promisor was under
a positive duty to do acts reasonably calculated to bring the fund into
existence. They appear to be unusually favorable towards the promisee,
and almost invariably refuse to let him suffer nonpayment when there
is the slightest indication that the promisor has not acted reasonably to
effectuate the existence of the fund. 7 The general conclusion reached
is that the promisor must be "free from fault" where his efforts to
raise the fund have been unavailing.8
Another line of cases analogous to the subject of this discussion
involves the question whether a judicial, executive, or administrative
order .restraining or preventing performance of a contract is an impossibility that will excuse a promisor. The analogy is in the problem
whether the promisor, to prevent a breach of contract, must make an
effort to procure the abandoning or dissolution of such a restraining
order. There are cases holding that an injunction secured by a private
party will not excuse a breach of contract where the contract is lawful
and possible of fulfillment, for the injunction should have been dissolved." If the legal proceedings are in any way due to the fault of
Nunez v. Dautel, 19 Wall. 560, 22 L. ed. 161 (U. S. 1873) ; Smithers v.
Junker, 41 Fed. 101 (C. C. N. D. Il. 1889) (where the court said: "Such contracts should be construed liberally, in favor of the payees.") ; Hood v. Hampton
Plains Exploration Co., 106 Fed. 408 (C. C. D. Nev. 1901); Williston v. Perkins,
51 Cal. 554 (1876).
1 Simpson v. Kimberlin, 12 Kan. 579 (1874) (D was under contract with P to
recover by suit from X certain damages to which D was entitled, and P was to
be paid a certain sum out of the sum recovered from X. D commenced the action
but did not prosecute it in good faith and so collected nothing. Held, P is entitled
to recover the amount he would have realized if D had faithfully prosecuted his
action against X).
'South Memphis Land Co. v. McLean Hardwood Lumber Co., 179 Fed. 417
(C. C. A. 6th, 1910) ; Klauber v. San Diego Street-Car Co., 95 Cal. 353, 357, 30
Pac. 555 (1892) (where the court said: "No case has been cited in which it has
been held that interference by a writ, sued out by a private litigant, will excuse
performance of a contract, although it may deprive the contractor of the means
of performance."); Sample v. Fresno Flume & Irrigation Co., 129 Cal. 222, 61
Pac. 1085 (1900).
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the promisor, the interference should constitute no defense. 10 Even
those cases that recognize the rule that restraining proceedings, resulting from no fault of the promisor, should be an excuse, add that the
promisor in an honest effort to carry out his agreement must, if possible, procure a dissolution of the injunction.11 The general trend of
these cases is to place on the promisor a duty to make a reasonable and
diligent effort to obtain the sanction of such judicial, administrative,
or executive body by a removal of the restraining order.'2
It is clearly seen that no "rule of thumb" can be found whereby to
determine what diligence may be required in any "sanction obtaining"
attempt. Possibly this is due to the present scarcity of applicable cases.
But in view of the rapidly growing number of instances in which conduct requires the approval of administrative officers or agencies, the
problem is likely to become increasingly important.
HARRY MCMULLAN, JR.

Deeds-Construction-Conflict between Specific and
General Descriptions.
Defendants executed a deed of trust upon certain land as security for
personal indebtedness. Upon default of payment, the deed of trust
was foreclosed, and the plaintiff became purchaser at the foreclosure
sale. Both in the deed of trust and in the later deed from the substituted trustee to the plaintiff the descriptions of the land were identical,
containing a particular or specific description by metes and bounds of
lots 1, 2, and 3, followed by a general decription "And all those certain
lots conveyed to [defendant grantor] . . ." by deeds of designated
registry whose descriptions embraced lots 3, 4, and 5. Situated upon
lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 were a dwelling house, garage, and front yard;
but only the yard and a small portion of the dwelling were covered 'by
lots 1, 2, and 3. Plaintiff brought ejectment for possession of all five
lots. Held, both the particular and general descriptions controlled, and
the plaintiff was entitled to succeed as to all the lots.'
Numerous decisions have enunciated the principle that when a deed
contains both a specific and a general description and they are repugnant to or in conflict with one another, the specific description will
"0Primos Chemical Co. v. Fulton Steel Corp., 266 Fed. 937 (N. D. N. Y.
1920) (voluntary receivership in which promisee participated).
" See Peckham v. Industrial Securities Co., 31 Del. 200, 206, 113 Atl. 799,
802 (1921) (approving rule, and adding, "But in the honest effort to carry out his
agreement he must, if possible, procure the dissolution of the injunction or secure
the dismissal of the interfering proceeding by removing the cause therefor.").
126 WILLIsON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1938) §1939.

' Realty Purchase Corp. v. Fisher, 216 N. C. 197, 4 S. E. (2d) 518 (1939).
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control. 2 This rule has been termed one of the most rigid of the rules
of construction3 and declared derived from "common sense and common experience". 4 Its basis is that ". .

the law prefers the best ev-

idence as to the intention of the parties and when properly considered
the particular description is more certain and reliable than the other
one

. . .,

and further,

"...

that the parties are presumed to be

governed by the description which they make specific when it is in conflict with another."6 Yet this rule is not absolute or dogmatically
applicable in every instance, as it is subject to disparity of application
7
a well as to doctrinal exceptions in various jurisdictions.
By universal consensus the cardinal consideration in the constructioft
of deeds is to ascertain the true intent of the parties.8 Whenever found,
such intent must govern. A familiar postulate is that intention must
be gleaned from a consideration of the entire instrument after looking
at the four corners of it.9 Technical rules of construction may aid in the
discovery of intent, and in the absence of stronger evidence may prevail.' 0 The general rule that a definite specific description will dominate a conflicting general description may thus be rebutted when a court
conceives the manifest intent of the grantor to be that the general
description shall prevail." In its inquiry, a court is concerned only
with intent actually expressed by the grantor's language, as distinguished from unexpressed but desired intent. 12 No precise or readily
- Everitt v. Thomas, 23 N. C. 252 (1840) ; Cox v. McGowan, 116 N. C. 131,
21 S. E. 108 (1891) ; Johnson v. Case, 131 N. C. 491, 42 S. E. 957 (1902) ; Gaylord v. McCoy, 158 N. C. 325, 74 S. E. 321 (1912) ; Potter v. Bonner, 174 N. C.
20, 93 S. E. 370 (1917) ; Von Herff v. Richardson, 192 N. C. 595, 135 S. E. 533
(1926). For extensive collection of cases from other states see: 2 DEVLiN, DEEDS
(3d ed. 1911) §1039, n. 5; 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (1924) §3158, n. 8; Note
(1931) 72 A. L. R. 410.
Perry v. Buswell, 113 Me. 399, 94 AtI. 483 (1915).
'Holman v. Houston Oil Co., 152 S.W. 885 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
'Dill-Crammer-Truitt Corp. v. Jacksonville Lumber Co., 183 N. C. 660, 668,
112 S. E. 740, 745 (1922).
,
o Cox v. McGowan, 116 N. C. 131, 137, 21 S.E. 108, 110 (1891).
"Note (1931) 72 A. L. R. 410.
82 DEVLIN, DEEDS (3d ed. 1911) §§835, 836, 840, 1035.
'2 DEVLIN, DEEDS (3d ed. 1911) §1039; 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (1924)
§3162.
Perry v. Buswell, 113 Me. 399, 94 At. 483 (1915).
"Sutton, S.& S. Mfg. Co. v. McCullough, 64 Colo. 415, 174 Pac. 302 (1918)
(general clause reading "all the real estate of said grantor . . .in said Summit
County . . .whether the same is particularly described herein or otherwise");
McKinney v. Raydure, 181 Ky. 163, 203 S. W. 1084 (1918); Dochterman v.
Marshall, 92 Miss. 747, 46 So. 542 (1908) (governed by relation of the parties) ;
Thomson v. Thomson, 115 Mo. 56, 21 S. W. 1085 (1893); Adams v. Alkire, 20
W. Va. 480 (1882); see Hatcher v. Virginia Min. Co., 214 Ky. 193, 196, 282
S. W. 1102, 1104 (1926) ; Rosenberger v. Wabash Ry., 96 Mo. App. 504, 507, 70
S. W. 395 (1903); Whitaker v. Whitaker, 175 Mo. 1, 4, 74 S. W. 1029, 1031
(1903) ; 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (1924) §3162.
"See Seawell v. Hall, 185 N. C. 80, 82, 116 S.E. 189, 190 (1923) ; 2 DEvLI.N,
DEmS (3d ed. 1911) §837; 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (1924) §3076.
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applicable criterion has been prescribed to govern a court in recognizing clear and manifest intent.13 As acutely observed by Ruffin, J.,
".... attempts have been made to establish artificial rules for discovering
the intention; and the offices of terms of general and specific description
defined. The truth is, no positive rule can be laid down; for as each
subject differs in some respects from another, and each writer will be
more or less precise or perspicuous in expressing himself, the whole
instrument is to be looked at, and the inquiry then made, can it be found
out, from this, what the party means."'14 Since intention must necessarily remain a pliant concept, each decision partakes somewhat of a law
unto itself. It is commonly recited that the court should assume the
position of the parties at the time of execution, and that in the event of
doubtful or ambiguous language resort may be had to the attendant circumstances and the situation of the parties. 15 Other rules of construction invoked are: First, that every clause should be regarded as inserted
for a purpose and whenever possible each word should be rendered
operative ;16 and second, an instrument should be construed most strongly
against a grantor in the event of uncertainty.' 7 However, it is said
that the latter should be resorted to only if construction is doubtful
after application of all other rules.' 8
Apparently little or no importance is accorded the relative positions
of the specific and the general descriptions in a deed, although certain
earlier decisions evidently attached weight to this factor. 1 A particular
description by metes and bounds will undoubtedly prevail when a court
concludes that the insertion of a general description had as its purpose
either: (1) to show the grantor's source or chain of title;20 (2) to
"8See Lincoln v. Wilder, 29 Me. 169, 181 (1848). In Walsh v. Hill, 38 Cal. 481,
487 (1869), it was said: "In the construction of written instruments, we have never
derived much aid from the technical rules of the books. The only rule of much
value . . . is to place ourselves as near as possible in the seats which wvere occupied by the parties at the time the instrumebt was executed; then taking it by its
four corners, read it."
14 Proctor v. Pool, 15 N. C. 371, 373 (1833).
2 DEvLiN, DEEDS (3d ed. 1911) §§839, 1038; 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY
(1924) §3075.
184 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (1924) §3075.

'"
In Ferguson v. Champion Fibre Co., 182 N. C. 731, 735, 110 S. E. 220, 223
(1921), it was said by Walker, J., after conceeding the rule that a deed must be
construed most strongly against the grantor: ". . . that does not mean that its
description must be made to include land not covered by it." See 2 DEVLiN,

DEEDS

(3d ed. 1911) §848; 4 THOMPSON,

REAL

PROPERTY (1924) §§3166, 3167

(rule not applicable to grant from sovereign).
See 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (1924) §3166; (1919) 6 VA. L. REV. 63.
19 See 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (1924)
§3165.
Prentice v. Northern Pac. Ry., 154 U. S.163, 14 Sup. Ct. 997, 38 L. ed. 947
18

20

(1894); Lovejoy v. Lovett, 124 Mass. 270 (1878); Dow v. Whitney, 147 Mass.
1, 16 N. E. 722 (1888); Von Herff v. Richardson, 192 N. C. 595, 135 S.E. 533
(1926); 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (1924) §3161.

19401

0NOTES AND COMMENTS

further identify the land ;21 or (3) to reiterate or redescribe for em22
phasis or clarification.
Controversy has arisen when the general description assumed one
of the following forms: First, where the land was designated by its
particular or well-known name, e.g. "known as the Wooldridge plantation". North Carolina concurs with other states in ruling that such
general description must yield to a more particular description by metes
and bounds.2 3 However, numerous decisions dissent from this view
and allow the general designation to prevail as a manifestation of the
grantors intent.2 4 Second, where there was a declaration that "all" of
the grantor's land in a particular locality is to pass. If additional land
beyond that specifically described would pass by effectuating such clause,
then North Carolina, among other states, holds that it must be subordinated to the particular designation ;25 but elsewhere there are many
decisions to the contrary.20 Third, where there was a statement of
quantity, e.g. "said tract embracing 700 acres". Ordinarily, a reference
to quantity has no effect beyond assistance to the particular description,2 7 yet, in a few instances where a grantor has unequivocally expressed an intent to -pass only a certain quantity of land, this has taken
28
precedence over a specific description by metes and bounds.
1 Carter v. White, 101 N. C. 30, 7 S. E. 473 (1888); Midgett v. Twiford,
120 N. C. 4, 26 S.E. 626 (1896) ; Johnson v. Case, 131 N. C. 491, 42 S.E. 957
(1902)
; Roper Lumber Co. v. McGowan, 168 N. C. 86, 83 S.E. 16 (1914).
22
Baltimore Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Bethel, 120 N. C. 344, 27 S. E. 29 (1897);
Gaylord v. McCoy, 158 N. C. 325, 74 S. E. 321 (1912); Ferguson v. Champion
Fibre Co., 182 N. C.731, 110 S. E. 220 (1921).

2' Carter v. White, 101 N. C. 30, 7 S. E. 473 (1888) ("known by name of
Walker's Island"); Roper Lumber Co. v. McGowan, 168 N. C. 86, 83 S.E. 16

(1914)

("the Hancy Jones land"); Guilmartin v. Wood, 76 Ala. 204 (1884);

Pettit v. Gibson, 201 Ala. 177, 77 So. 703 (1917) ("home place of P, Sr., now
deceased"); Osteen v. Wynn, 131 Ga. 209, 62 S.E. 37 (1908) ("known as Wooldridge plantation") ; Coppermines Co. v. Comins, 38 Nev. 359, 148 Pac. 349 (1915)
("as Comins Ranch"); Roberts v. Dreyer, 200 S. W. 1097 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1918) ("old Dreyer Homestead"); cf. Dill-Cramer-Truitt Corp. v. Jacksonville
Lumber Co., 183 N. C. 660, 112 S.E. 740 (1922).
'Lodge's Lessee v. Lee, 6 Cranch 237, 8 L. ed. 210 (U. S. 1810) ; Haley v.
Amestoy, 44 Cal. 132 (1872) ; Martin v. Lloyd, 94 Cal. 195, 29 Pac. 491 (1892) ;
Moir-Nandorf v. Milner, 34 Idaho 396, 201 Pac. 720 (1921); Dochterman v.
Marshall, 92 Miss. 747, 46 So. 542 (1908); Reddock v. Williams, 129 Miss. 706,
92 So. 831 (1922).
"Gaylord v. McCoy, 158 N. C. 325, 74 S. E. 321 (1912) ; West v. Hermann,
104 S. W. 428 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907); Spiller v. Scribner, 36 Vt. 245 (1863);
Cummings v. Black, 65 Vt. 76, 25 Atl. 906 (1892); cf. Murphy v. Murphy, 132
N. C. 360, 43 S. E. 922 (1903).
2" Costello v. Graham, 9 Ariz. 257, 80 Pac. 336 (1905) ; Clifton Heights Land
Co. v. Randell, 82 Iowa 89, 47 N. W. 905' (1891) ("....
all other lands that may
not have been heretofore described belonging to said grantor") ; Marr v. Hobson,
22 Me. 321 (1843) ; Lauchheirner v. Saunders, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 484, 65 S. W.
500 (1901).
272 DEv-.I., DEEDS (3d ed. 1911) §1044; 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (1924)
§3148.
"8Sanders v. Godding, 45 Iowa 463 (1877) ("said tract to contain just one
acre, and the distances shall be so construed"); Tompkins v. Thomas, 54 Tex.
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A comparison of cases clearly illustrates the irreconcilable conflicts
to be met in determining what language will constitute a manifest expression of intent. In certain deeds where specific descriptions by
metes and bounds were followed by general clauses reading "the
9
and "the purpose
premises hereby intended to be conveyed being. .. ,2a
and intent of this deed being to convey.. .",80 these general descriptions
were held such unequivocal expressions of intent as necessarily to control.31 However, in direct opposition stand those cases where the general descriptions read "this deed is intended to convey.. .",2 "meaning
and intending to convey . ..,3a "intending to convey the same and
identical real estate ... " ;3 yet the court decreed that they must yield
to prior delineations by metes and bounds.
Numerous cases have involved the construction of deeds whose
descriptive language closely paralleled that of the principal case, there
being a specific description by metes and bounds followed by a general description of the land as "being all that tract conveyed to [grantor]
by" a prior deed whose description embraced additional land beyond
that particularly marked off. A majority of those decisions have ruled
that the specific description must prevail over the more general one,
which is construed to be inserted merely to fortify the preceding description or else to show chain or title, as distinguished from a purpose
of fixing boundaries.3 5 This view is taken by the United States Supreme Court, which interpreted the words "and being" as equivalent
to "which is", thus indicating reiteration rather than independent
Civ. App. 440, 118 S. W. 581 (1909) ; see 2 DEvLIN,

DEEDs

(3d ed. 1911) §1045;

4 THompsoN, REAI PROPETY (1924) §3149.

"' Ousby v. Jones, 73 N. Y. 621 (1878).
'0Plummer v. Gould, 92 Mich. 1 (1892). Accord: Bates v. Foster, 59 Me.
157 (1870) ; Witt v. St. Paul Ry., 38 Minn. 122, 35 N. W. 862 (1888).
31In Pendrey v. Godwin, 188 Ala. 565, 66 So. 43 (1914), a general clause
reading, "And it is understood that the purpose of this conveyance is to convey
to P ... the Jess Myers place, whether the above description is correct or not..."
controlled the prior particular description. In Flagg v. Bean, 25 N. H. 49 (1852),
three parcels were specifically described and then a general clause "meaning to
convey all the land I purchased of .

. . ,

referring to their deeds for particulars

...all land set forth in said deed and no more." Although the general description
passed only a one-half undivided interest, it was allowed to prevail.
8'Potter v. Bonner, 174 N. C. 20, 93 S.E. 370 (1917).
"Smith v. Sweat; 90 Me. 528, 38 Ati. 554 (1897). Accord: Winn v. Cabot,
35 Mass. 553 (1837).
" Brunswick Savings Instit. v. Crossman, 76 Me. 577 (1885).
"Smith v. Sweat, 90 Me. 528, 38 Atl. 554 (1897) ; Jones v. Webster, 85 Me.
210, 27 At!. 705 (1892) ; Brown v. Heard, 85 Me. 294, 27 At. 182 (1893) ; Lovejoy v. Lovett, 124 Mass. 270 (1878); Dow v. Whitney, 147 Mass. 1, 16 N. E. 722
(1888); Everitt v. Thomas, 23 N. C. 252 (1840); Cox v. McGowan, 116 N. C.
131, 21 S.E. 108 (1891) ; Johnson v. Case, 131 N. C. 491, 42 S. E. 957 (1902) ;
Potter v. Bonner, 174 N. C. 20, 93 S. E. 370 (1917) ; Von Herff v. Richardson,
192 N. C. 595, 135 S.E. 533 (1926) ; Cullers v. Platt, 81 Tex. 258, 16 S.W. 1003
(1891); Cutler Co. v. Barber, 93 Vt. 468, 108 Atl. 400 (1919). Further cases
collected in 4 THoMPsoN, REAL PROPERTY (1924) §3161, n. 28.
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description." Yet, there are decisions which, in identically worded
deeds, have found a manifest intent that the general description shall
control.37 One well-established exception to the general rule is that
if the specific description be proven erroneous or void for insufficiency,
the general description may then be utilized.3, Clearly illustrative of
this principle is Child v. Fiquet,3 9 where the deed read "three parcels
of land situated . . ."and then proceeded to specifically mark off only

one parcel, but subsequently referred to the land as "being the same
conveyed by" a prior deed which covered all three parcels. This general description was held sufficient to pass all three parcels, in accord
with the obvious intent of the grantor. Sweeping language found in
the decisions of one state would appear to sanction the dominance of a
general over a specific description as the rule rather than the exception,
40
but such phraseology is seemingly negatived by actual practice.
North Carolina precedents have given close adherence to the general rule.41 In Cox v. McGowan42 the specific description embodied
more acreage than would have passed under the general description
of "being the part of the G. land conveyed to him by G. and containing
87 acres more or less". It was there said: "In doubtful cases the rule
that the construction must be favorable to the grantee will prevail ...
but whether a specific description comes before or after a general
" Prentice v. Northern Pac. Ry., 154 U. S. 163, 14 Sup. Ct. 997, 38 L. ed. 947
(1894).
466, 21 N. E. 850 (1889); Wuesthoff v. Seymour,
" Boone v. Clark, 129 Ill.
22 N. J. Eq. 66 (1871); Adams v. Alkire, 20 W. Va. 480 (1882). Accord: Lake
Erie & W. Ry. v. Whiten, 155 Ill.
514, 40 N. E. 1014 (1895).
" Campbell v. McArthur, 9 N. C. 33 (1822) (mistake in a specific description
should not defeat the intent of the parties where intent is manifest and a means
of correcting the mistake is furnished by reference to another deed); Ritter v.
Barrett, 20 N. C. 266 (1838); Crews v. Crews, 210 N. C. 217, 186- S. E. 156
(1936) (mistake of draftsman); Weller v. Barber, 110 Mass. 44 (1872). See
cases collected in 2 DEVLIN, DEEDS (3d ed. 1911) §1041, n. 3; Note (1931) 72
A. L. R. 410. Contra: Guilmartin v. Wood, 76 Ala. 204 (1884) (general description forced to yield to erroneous specific description).
"4 Me. 471 (1827).
The following language is found in Marshall v. McLean, 3 Iowa 363, 367
(1852) : "A particular description should never control a general one unless the
object is to render that which is general and uncertain more specific, definite, and
certain." In Barney v. Miller, 18 Iowa 460, 466 (1865), the court said: "Where
a deed ...contains a general description of the property conveyed which is definite
or certain in itself and is followed by a particular description also, such particular
description will not limit or restrict . . ."-but "all ... estate ... in those lands...
known as Half Breed Tract" was held not to be a sufficiently definite general
description. Again in In re Orwig, 185 Iowa 913, 167 N. W. 654 (1918), a general
designation of "commonly known as no. 1210 Pleasant St." was held not sufficiently
certain.
,"See note 2, supra. Also: Carter v. White, 101 N. C. 30, 7 S.E. 473 (1888);
Midgett v. Twiford, 120 N. C. 4, 26 S. E. 626 (1896) ; Building & Loan Ass'n v.
Bethel, 120 N. C. 344, 27 S. E. 29 (1897) ; Roper Lumber Co. v. McGowan, 168
N. C. 86, 83 S.E. 16 (1914); Sugg v. Greenville, 169 N. C. 606, 86 S. E. 695
(1915); Ferguson v. Champion Fibre Co., 182 N. C. 731; 110 S. E. 220 (1921).
.2 116 N. C. 131, 21 S. E. 108 (1891).
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designation it must prevail upon the underlying principle that the law
will always demand the production of fhe highest evidence, and as
'43
between two descriptions will prefer that which is most certain.
Again, in Ferguson v. Champion Fibre Co.44 it was said: "If the first
description by metes and bounds does not embrace the locits in quo,
the second one should not be allowed to control it, and thereby enlarge
its boundaries, unless it was the clear, if not manifest, intention of the
grantor to do so and to convey lands not covered by the first description." And in that case the general description, by way of reference
to a prior deed, was deemed inserted ". . . merely to repeat the former
description, but in different, and as he evidently supposed, plainer and
more unmistakable language." In two instances there has been apparent contravention of the general rule, but held justified in order to
effectuate the clear and manifest intent of the grantor as expressed in
the instrument. In Dill-Cramer-Truitt Corp. v. Jacksonville Lumber
Co. 45 the land was generally described as "Town Point Plantation" and
then specifically delineated by metes and bounds which failed to include
all the tract embraced by "Town Point Plantation", as its boundaries
were known to the public. It was held that the particular description
was erroneous and must yield, heavy reliance being placed on the fact
that the land involved had been previously levied upon and advertised
for foreclosure sale under the designation of "Town Point Plantation".
In Quelch v. Futch46 the deed contained a specific description followed
by a declaration that "the tract hereby conveyed being the same deeded
by W. to K. . . ."-the latter deed encompassing land in addition to
that particularly described. Such language was held to plainly manifest an intent that the general description prevail over the erroneous
description by metes and bounds, and thus pass the larger tract. As a
process of reasoning, it seems that once the general description is discovered to be clearly and manifestly intended to control then a fortiori
a conflicting specific description is erroneous. To be distinguished from
the problem at hand is the practice of naming or partially describing a
tract and then adding "for more specific description reference is hereby
made to X deed', in which case the description of the deed referred to
47
will be embodied into the deed in question.
" Cf. Reddick v. Leggat, 7 N. C. 539 (1819). In this case it is said that a par.icular description may abridge and limit, but not enlarge a general description;
vet, illustrations given apparently contradict this rule.
",182 N. C. 731, 736, 110 S. E. 220, 223 (1921).

'I 183 N. C 660, 112 S. E. 740 (1922).

1T 172 N. C. 316. 90 S. E. 259 (1916).
' Euliss v. McAdams, 108 N. C. 507, 13 S. E. 162 (1891)

("for more specific

description reference is made to . . !') ; Williams v. Bailey, 178 N. C. 630, 101
S. E. 105 (1919)- ("B. Allen place, for a full description of which reference is
hereby made to deed from ... to . . . at ... ).
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The instant case is unique in its particular fact situation. The general description of "all those certain lots conveyed to [defendant] . .. "
embraces only 6ne of the three lots specifically described but includes
two additional lots. The lappage as to number 3 may possibly be explained by the fact that lots 3 and 4 were conveyed to the defendant
by a single deed, and thus any reference to the deed passing lot 4 would
necessarily include also lot 3. This is apart from the usual case where
the general description includes both the land specifically described and
also additional land. It lends credence to the majority holding that
there is no variance between the two descriptions, but rather that the
latter description is independent of and additional to the specific description. This conclusion admits application of the rule that where two
descriptions can be reconciled, both must stand. 4 3 Yet it is significant
to note that lots 17 and 18, which were not involved in the present
appeal, were included in both the specific and general descriptions. This
would seem to weaken considerably the view that the instant deed contains two independent and exclusive descriptions which are not in conflict. Admitting the principle that a grantor's manifest intent, once
discovered, must be effectuated even though it contravenes the settled
rule that a specific description controls a general one, does such manifest intent appear here? As a matter of form, the language of the
instant deed obviously coincides with that of many previous cases which
have reached a different conclusion. Yet upon resort to the situation
of the parties it appears rather illogical that the defendant should secure
a substantial loan by a deed of trust covering his front yard, concrete
walk, and only a fractional part of his dwelling, especially since his
application for a loan was accompanied by a description and photographs of the dwelling. This restricted conveyance results if the
specific description alone is allowed to govern. So it seems not unlikely that a consideration of economic factors proved some guide to
the court in its ascertainment of intent. And, when it is remembered
that cases such as the principal one hinge upon the highly intricate concept of intent and thus depend to a peculiar degree upon the particular
facts at hand, then perhaps the instant holding does not too severely
affront the past.
JAMES

K.

DORSETT, JR.

Defamation-Liability of Broadcasting Company for Defamatory
Remarks Transmitted over Its Facilities.
Defendant broadcasting company leased its facilities to a commercial
advertising company for a series of broadcasts sponsored by a large
"sProctor v. Pool, 15 N. C. 370 (1833) ; Murphy v. Murphy, 132 N. C. 360,
43 S. E. 922 (1903).
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oil corporation. All participants in the program were employed by the
advertising company. The principal performer deviated from the script
prepared by the advertising company and approved by the radio company, and uttered an extemporaneous remark concerning plaintiff, a
hotel, which sued the broadcasting company for defamation. Held, conceding the remark to have been defamatory, the defendant was not liable
in the absence of negligence on its part.'
Although there have been but few cases involving this problem, the
majority of those decided have held that a broadcasting company is
2
absolutely liable for defamatory remarks broadcast over its facilities.
The theory of this rule is that since a radio, like a newspaper, has the ability to reach vast numbers of people, the liability of a broadcasting company for publishing defamatory remarks should be the same as that of a
newspaper. By means of the same analogy, most of the cases have held
that defamation by means of radio should be treated as libel rather than
slander. 3 One case, however, has taken the view that defamatory remarks not actually written in the script are slander,4 regardless of the
number of people listening. In any event, this distinction affects only
the requirements of proof; the only difference is that in an action for
slander the plaintiff must show that the remarks are slanderous per se
or must prove special damages, whereas, if the remarks are treated as
libel, no proof of special damages is necessary.
Many writers have criticized 5 the use of the newspaper analogy in
cases involving extemporaneous remarks on the basis of the difference
in the two methods of publication. The newspaper publisher has the
power and the opportunity to eliminate defamatory material, because all
printed matter goes through his hands, or those of agents directly responsible to him, before it is finally published and delivered to the
public. The broadcasting company, on the other hand, while it may
call for and edit the script of a program, has no way of knowing whether
the script will be strictly followed when the program is broadcast, and
has no means of keeping the defamatory remark off the air once it has
'Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 302 (Pa. 1939).
2 Coffey

v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W. D. Mo. 1934);

Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82 (1932); Irwin v. Ashurst, 158

Ore. 61, 74 P. (2d) 1127 (1938) (broadcaster not liable because the speaker had
a privilege, but the court approved of the analogy advanced by the Sorensen
case); Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P. (2d) 847 (1933).
' See cases in footnote 2, supra, where the analogy of libel is used both in the
determination of the character of the words and in the fixing of the responsibility.

'Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299 N. Y. Supp. 188 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
' Guider, Liability for Defamation, in Political Broadcasts (1932) 2 J. RADIO
L. 708; Huston, Liability of Broadcasting Company (1932) 12 Oia. L. REV. 149;
Nash, The Application of the Law of Libel and Slander to- Radio Broadcasting
(1937) 17 Om,. L. Rrv. 307; Thornton, Liability of Radio Re-Broadcaster (1934)
14 ORE. L. Ray. 492.
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been spoken into the microphone.0 For these reasons most writers take
the view that although the newspaper publisher should be subjected to
liability without fault, the radio company should not be placed under
such a strict rule.
It appears that the analogy can be criticized, however, even where
the script is checked by the company and strictly followed. In the case
of newspaper publishing, the agents of the publisher write the material, and are supposed to write only facts which they have investigated
and know to be the truth. Many times, however, as in the instant
case, radio script is written by companies not responsible to the broadcasting company, which has no time to ascertain the truth of the
remarks.
Several of the critics have offered analogies of their own. 7 Probably the most widespread is that of the telegraph company. Similarity
is said to exist here because the radio company, like the telegraph company, does not have time to examine the submitted material to discover
its truth or defamatory character unless the material is clearly defamatory on its face. In the telegraph cases, the company has a privilege
to send a defamatory message provided it uses due care in receiving
and transmitting the message.8 Other analogies offered are those of
the news vendor, who is not subjected to liability if he did not know
the material contained a libel, and if this ignorance was not due to any
negligence on his part,9 and the owner of a loudspeaking device set up
in public halls, and rented for public addresses, 10 in which case it has
been suggested that the newspaper analogy, carried to this extreme,
would be absurd. The court in the instant case, while it considered the
analogy of the loudspeaker nearest to the problem at hand," rejected
all these analogies on the ground that none of them were exactly similar
to the problem.
The court took the view that the distinctions between libel and
slander were inapplicable to radio broadcasting,12 and seemed to regard
defamation by means of radio as a new tort for which there should be
I See Nash, The Application of the Law of Libel and Slander to Radio Broadcasting (1937) 17 ORE. L. REv. 307, 311; (1932) 18 CoRr. L. Q. 124, 127. Contra:

Void, Defamation by Radio (1932) 2 J. RADIO L. 673, 682.

Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts (1936) 50 HARv. L. Ray. 725; Nash, The Application of the Law of Libel and Slander to Radio Broadcasting (1937) 17 ORE. L.
Ray.8 307.

Nye v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 104 Fed. 628 (C. C. D. Minn. 1900);

Western Uhion Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 294 Fed. 167 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923); see

Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 302, 309 (Pa. 1939).
o See Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts (1936)
STATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §581, comment f.

50 HARV. L. Rrv. 725, 731; RE-

See Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts (1936) 50 HARV. L. Ray. 725, 731.
a2 Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d) 302, 309 (Pa.
1939).
12 Id. at 310.
10
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no liability where there was no fault. It was stated that a high standard
of care was necessary in order to protect the public, but that this
necessity was adequately met by the rigid requirements imposed on
radio broadcasting by means of federal statutes.' 3 Moreover, the rule
of liability without fault might open the door to frauds against the
broadcaster, if an unscrupulous performer should conspire with a lis14
tener in order to impose liability on the radio company.
Aside from the difference in the methods of publication, there seems
to be another reason why broadcasting companies should not be subjected to liability without fault as are newspaper publishers. In most
cases of libel published by newspapers, the injured person has no recourse except against the publisher; whereas, in the case of defamation
by means of radio, the injured person has a claim against the person
uttering the defamatory remarks or against the company that employed
him. For these reasons, it seems that the Pennsylvania court has
adopted a better rule than that laid down by the courts which have considered the problem heretofore.
The court in the principal case had a greater incentive to lay down
a rule of due care than most courts, since in Pennsylvania a newspaper
publishing a libel is subjected to this standard and not to the rule of
absolute liability. 15 If, however, as most of the courts have held,
defamation by means of radio is to be governed by the rules of defamation and not of negligence, it would seem that the radio company should
be allowed a privilege similar to that of the telegraph company when,
as in the instant case, it has no control over the uttering of the defamatory remark. This rule would accomplish substantially the same result
as that laid down by the Pennsylvania court, since the broadcasting company would be protected by the privilege only so long as it exercized
due care. Adoption of such a rule would not necessitate a departure
from the established rules of defamation, and, thus, would be desirable
for those courts which do not wish to make such a departure.
FRANK N. PATTERSON, JR.
Escheat-jurisdiction of State Court over Funds in Custody
of United States Treasury.
The United States District Court for Eastern Pennsylvania ordered
payment by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company of certain moneys to
petitioners (bondholders).' Most, but not all, of the bondholders filed
1350 STAT. 190, 191 (1937), 47 U. S. C. A. §303 (1937).
' See Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 A. (2d)
302, 311
(Pa. 1939).
"Id. at 307; Clark v. North American Co., 203 Pa. 346, 53 Atl. 237 (1902).
'Brown v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 229 Fed. 444 (E. D. Pa. 1916), aff'd, 235
Fed. 669 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916).
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their claims; and the unclaimed moneys were paid into the registry of
the court. Later on appeal, the circuit court of appeals denied a petition
that the unclaimed moneys be divided pro rata among those whose
claims had been approved ;2 and the balance of the fund was transferred
to the United States Treasury through the Federal Reserve Bank in
Philadelphia.3 The state's petition for the escheat of the fund was
denied without prejudice.4 In conformity with a state statute 5 appellee,
Escheator of Pennsylvania, gave notice by publication of his intention
to file a plea in the state court. Petition was dismissed, but on appeal
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court this decree was reversed, 6 and the
United States Supreme Court affirmed this judgment.7 During the
interim the Pennsylvania Railroad Company filed a claim for the
moneys, which was denied." In 1938 appellee filed an amended petition
in a federal district court praying for an order directing the payment
to appellee of these moneys as to which the escheat had been declared
by the state court. This prayer was granted, and the circuit court
of appeals now affirms the decree. 9 Thecourt reasoned that in order
for the state court to have jurisdiction, the res escheated must have
its situs within the territorial limits of the state, but need not actually be seized by the state court or be in its possession. Furthermore,
since the United States did not claim the fund, transfer to the United
States Treasury did not change the Pennsylvania situs of the fund.
The immediate problem presented .by this case is the validity of the
state's title under the escheat proceeding in the state court. Consideration of this problem, however, entails discussion of the jurisdiction of
a state to escheat intangibles, particularly those in the possession and
under the control of the United States Government.
Escheat is an exercise of sovereignty, as distinguished from succession, as to heirs and next of kin. 10 It has been held that the principle
of ultimate ownership of everything within the jurisdiction of the
sovereign is the basis for the right of escheat." Obviously, the jurisdictional question as to immovables is simple; but when it arises with
regard to movables, and especially to intangibles, the difficulties are
manifest. In a consideration of the jurisdiction of courts to escheat
2 Brown v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 279 Fed. 417 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922).
'REV. STAT. §996 (1897), 35 U. S. C. §852 (1934). As further involving the

application of this statute, see United States v. Cochrane, 87 F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A.
5th, 1936).
'Klein v. Brodbeck, 15 F. Supp. 473 (E. D. Pa. 1934).
rPA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 27 §282.
11n re Escheat of Moneys in Custody of United States Treasury, 322 Pa.
481, 186, AtI. 600 (1936).
"United States v. Klein, 303 U. S. 276, 58 Sup. Ct. 536, 82 L. ed. 840 (1938).
8 Pennsylvania R. R. v. United States, 98 F. (2d) 893 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938).
United States v. Klein, 106 F. (2d) 213 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
'0 In re Miner's Estate, 143 Cal. 194, 76 Pac. 968 (1904).
1
" Klein v. Brodbeck, 15 F. Supp. 473 (E. D. Pa. 1934).
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intangibles it is helpful to consider the related jurisdictional field in
garnishments and attachments.
The proceeding in garnishment is often referred to as being quasi
in rem,'2 although it was originally a proceeding in rem. 13 Thus, as it
is now used, the term indicates a process by means of which real and
personal property of a debtor, in the hands of a third party, the garnishee, is applied to the payment of debts.14 Since garnishment is a
purely statutory proceeding, its application is limited to those specific
instances authorized by statute. 15
Apparently inseparable from the question of jurisdiction is that of
situs. Suppose A, who is domiciled in North Carolina, owes B, who is
domiciled in Tennessee, $500. B owes C, who is domiciled in North
Carolina, $500. If C starts garnishment proceedings, the question to be
determined is the situs of the res (A's debt to B)." 6 Cases similar to
this one have come before the courts many times. The court's answer
to the question settles the problem of jurisdiction. There is a conflict
in the decisions that have attempted arbitrarily to give a physical loca7
tion to an intangible.'
There is authority to the effect that a debt is garnishable in at least
four places: the place of payment ;18 the domicile of the creditor ;19 the
domicile of the debtor ;20 and wherever the debtor may be found.2 ' In
its decision in Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. v. Sturm, 22 the
United States Supreme Court dealt with the jurisdictional question of
power to garnish an indebtedness due a non-resident, who was not
" Penningtoa v. Fourth Nat. Bank of Cincinnati, 243 U. S. 269 37 Sup. Ct.
282, 61 L. ed. 713 (1917); see Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U. S. 185, 187, 7 Sup.
Ct. 165, 166, 30 L. ed. 372, 373 (1886); GOODRICH, CONFLICTr OF LAWS (2d ed.

1938) 143.
" Beale, Jurisdiction in Rem to Compel Payment of Debt (1913)

L. REv. 107, 118.

27 HARV.

"'American Cent. Ins. Co. of St. Louis v. Hettler, 37 Neb. 849, 56 N. W. 711
(1893).
" Siegel, Cooper & Co. v. Schueck, 167 Ill. 522, 47, N. E. 855 (1897).
(1901) 286; STUMBEEG,
LAWS (1937) 102.
'Note
(1928)
27
MICH.
L. Rv.207, 575.
8
"' MINoR, CONFLICT OF LAWS

OF

PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT

" Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Maggard, 6 Colo. App. 85, 39 Pac. 985 (1895);

STUMBFRG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF

LAwS (1937) 102.

19 Central Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Chattanooga, R. & C. R. R., 68 Fed. 685

(E. D. Tenn. 1895); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Nash, 118 Ala. 477, 23 So. 825

(1898) ; Central of Ga. Ry. v. Brinson, 109 Ga. 354, 34 S. E. 597 (1899); Johnson
Haldeman Co., 116 Ga. 13, 42 S. E. 385 (1902). Accord: Bullard v. Cameron,
61 Neb. 83, 84 N. W. 604 (1900). But see RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1934) §108.
v. Central of Ga. Ry., 110 Ga. 303, 34 S. E. 1002 (1900); Beasley v. Lennox-

"Swedish Am. Bank v. Bleecker, 72 Minn. 383, 75 N. W. 740 (1898) ; Berry

v. Davis, 77 Tex. 191, 13 S. W. 978 (1890); Bragg v. Gaynor, 85 Wis. 468, 55
N. W.
919 (1893).
' 1Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625, 49 L. ed. 1023 (1905).
22174 U. S. 710, 19 Sup. Ct. 797, 43 L. ed. 1144 (1899).
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under the jurisdiction of the court, by resting the power upon the control which the court had over the debtor.2 The Court rejected as too
indefinite the idea that a lebt has its situs where it is to be paid. In
another case, decided during the same year as the Sturm case, the Court
held that notice by publication to a non-resident creditor was sufficient. 24 And finally, in the famous case of Harrisv. Balk,25 the Supreme
Court decided that a debt may be garnished at any place in which the
debtor may be sued and that such proceedings are entitled to recogni26
tion in other jurisdictions under the full faith and credit clause.
It is submitted that the most logical and reasonable view is that
jurisdiction depends upon the ability to serve process within the territorial limits of the state upon the garnishee of the absent creditor. The
United States Supreme Court has held that the only essentials to the
exercise of the power of the states to seize tangible and intangible
property, in order to satisfy the obligations of absent owners, are the
presence of the res, its seizure at the commencement of the proceedings,
and the opportunity of the owner to be heard. 2 7 It seems obvious,
therefore, that the real basis of jurisdiction for garnishment is the
control which the court can exercise over the res or over the garnishee. 2 8
Although the majority rule seems to be that the contents of safety
deposit boxes may be levied upon, attached, or garnished, 29 with regard
to national banks, a federal statute prohibiting attachment was interpreted to include garnishment against such a bank as a principal defendant.30 There is a split of authority in the federal courts as to
whether government-controlled corporations should be subject to gar" In this case Sturm sued the railway company in Kansas for wages due, and
recovered the full amount. The company appealed and set up the fact that in
Iowa a creditor of Sturm 'had sued him and garnished the company there for
the wages sought to be recovered in the present suit. Further, this suit was still
pending in Iowa. Judgment was rendered for Sturm. On appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, it was held that the Iowa court had jurisdiction and that
the Kansas courts did not give to the Iowa proceedings the faith and credit to
which they were entitled in Kansas.
" King v. Cross, 175 U. S. 396, 20 Sup. Ct. 131, 44 L. ed. 211 (1899).
" 198 U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625, 49 L. ed. 1023 (1905). Beale, in Jurisdiction
in Rem, to Compel Payment of Debt (1913) 27 HAmv. L. REv. 107, 119, criticizes
the result of these cases. He argues that the decision in the Sturm case was the
product of faulty reasoning, and that consequently, in Harrisv. Balk the holding
was 8 not compatible with the nature of garnishment as a quasi-in-rem proceeding.
'1U. S. Coi'sr. Art. IV. §1.
27 Pennington v. Fourth Nat. Bank of Cincinnati, 243 U. S. 269, 37 Sup, Ct.
282, 61 L. ed. 713 (1917).
" Beale, in Jurisdiction in Rem to Compel Payment of Debt (1913) 27 HARV.
L. REv. 107, 109, suggests that possession by the debtor of property which can
be reached by the court is the basis of jurisdiction.
" Farmers' Savings Bank of Hartwick v. Roth, 195 Iowa 185, 191 N. W. 987
300 Mo. 417, 254 S. W. 166 (1923).
(1923) ; State ex rel. Rabiste v. Southern,
" Posselius v. First Nat. Bank, 264 Mich. 687, 251 N. W. 429 (1933).
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nishment,3 1 -but the various governmental units and their agencies are
usually exempt. 3 2
Although escheat is not wholly a statutory creation, as is garnishment, still its operation is regulated by statute, and in some states a
judicial proceeding is necessary.33 Each state has the power to determine the procedure necessary to enforce its right of escheat, which
includes the establishment of a time limit within which the property
must be claimed by the heirs, and the final disposition of the property
34
once it has passed to the state.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Klein85 expressly reserved
opinion on the questions of the effect on the state court's decree of the
absence of the fund from the state, and the absence or non-residence
of the unknown claimants. If the rules of the law of garnishment were
applied to the issues raised by the principal case, the following results
might be reached. Although the United States is not a debtor for the
amount, the funds are held in the Treasury. These funds are to be
paid to the proper persons on order of the district court.3 6 Thus the
place of payment is Pennsylvania and according to the courts that follow this view, the courts of the place of payment have jurisdiction over
the debt. A more difficult situation is presented when the "domicile of
the creditor" rule is applied. One of the issues of the case is the domicile of the missing bondholders, and to attempt to answer the problem
by assigning them a domicile would be merely to hazard a guess. Assuming for the purposes of analogy that the United States occupies a
position similar to that of the debtor in the garnishment cases, it is
obvious that the domicile of the debtor view cannot be adopted here,
since the United States Government has no domicile.3 7 If the rule as
announced in Harris v. Balk33 is followed, the debt may be attached
wherever the debtor may be found. The conclusion reached in the garnishment cases is that the real basis for jurisdiction for garnishment is
"Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. Landis, 261 Fed. 440 (E.D. Pa. 1919);
McCarthy v. United States Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corp., 53 F. (2d)
923 (App. D. C. 1931); Haines v. Lone Star Shipbuilding Co., 268 Pa. 92. 110
Atl. 788 (1920); 275 Pa. 260, 118 Atl. 909 (1922); Schnell, Federally Owned
Corporationsand Their Legal Problems (1936)

14 N. C. L. REv. 238, 261.

" State ex rel. Arkansas Construction Comm. v. Toler, 188 Ark. 1082. 69 S.W.
(2d) 394 (1934) ; White v. Wright, 151 Okla. 93, 1 P. (2d) 668 (1931).
"Louisville School Board v. King, 127 Ky. 824, 107 S.W. 247 (1908) ; State
v. Kearns, 79 Mont. 299, 257 Pac. 1002 (1927); Delaney v. State, 42 N. D. 630,
174 N. W. 290 (1919).
" Re Apostolopoulos, 68 Utah 344, 250 Pac. 469 (1926).
" 303 U. S.276, 58 Sup. Ct. 536, 82 L. ed. 840 (1938).
: REv. STAT. §996 (1897), 35 U. S. C. §852 (1934).
As was pointed out in Orinoco Iron Co. v. Metzel, 230 Fed. 40 (C. C. A.

6th, 1916), the jurisdiction of the federal courts in the administration of the
federal law is co-extensive with the United States. It seems that in very much
the same manner, the domicile of the Federal Government would be co-extensive
with38198
the U.
territorial
limits
country.
S. 215, 25 Sup.ofCt.the625,
49 L. ed. 1023 (1905).
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the possession by the lebtor of property that can be reached by the
court. If there is strict adherence to the technical interpretation of
"situs", there are two possibilities.
The money may actually have been transferred to the United States
Treasury in Washington, and in that event, its situs would be in the
District of Columbia. It is more likely, however, that the money or
fund was transferred to the Federal Reserve Bank in Philadelphia and
there credited to the account of the Treasury. If this be true, the
"'money" (i.e., the deposit account) never left the territorial jurisdiction of the state courts. But we have seen that national banks are not
subject to state escheat statutes and that usually federal agencies are
not subject to attachment and garnishment. Since accessibility of the
property to the court seems to be the real basis of jurisdiction, it reasonably follows that the state court -does not have the requisite control
over the money (deposit account), although it is within the limits of
the state. On the other hand, the Supreme Court, in its decision in
United States v. Klein,3 9 held that the jurisdiction "of the federal court
over the money is exclusive only in so far as is necessary for the appropriate disposition of the property. It is submitted, therefore, that
since the United States is merely a stakeholder, it has no standing to
appeal from the district court's order of payment. 40 For purely practical, non-legalistic reasons, it seems that the decision is correct, since
the possibility of the necessary claims being filed by the remaining
bondholders is slight; and since the Federal Government cannot escheat
the fund, the state should have it.
VIRGINIA EMERSON LEwis.

Injunction-Restraint against Defamation of a
Commercial Product.
Plaintiff company is engaged in the business of motion picture
production and distribution. It goes to large expense to furnish meritorious and attractive advertisements for display by its exhibitors.
Exhibitors of plaintiff's pictures are required by contract to advertise
them as "A Paramount Picture". Defendant, without the consent of
the plaintiff, manufactured and sold to these exhibitors deceptive,
grotesque, and erroneous displays to be used as advertisements of plaintiff's pictures. These displays also failed to identify the pictures as
"A Paramount Picture". Plaintiff, alleging that the exhibitors' use of
such advertising brought discredit to its pictures, impaired its good will
and injured its business, and tended to induce a breach of contract
"
S. Appellees,
276, 58 Sup. Ct. 536, 82 L. ed. 840 (1938).
" 303
BriefU.for
p. 20, United States v. Klein, 106 F. (2d) 213 (C. C. A.
3rd, 1939).
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with plaintiff, sought to enjoin the defendant from continuing the
manufacture and sale of such displays. Held, the complaint stated a
cause of action for injunction against defamation of the plaintiff's commercial product.1
The American courts still subscribe to the rule that injunction will
not be granted against libel or slander. 2 This is because of a now outmoded idea that equity does not protect interests of .personality,3 of an
over-literal conception of freedom of speech and press, 4 of the desirability of a jury's verdict on such issues of fact as truth or malice,5 and
of certain difficulties of drafting and enforcing the decree with justice
and efficiency. 6 The rule is strictly applied in the field of personal
defamation. 7 In the case of defamation of a business or of a commercial
product, however, injunctional relief is allowed without consideration
of the above-mentioned policy factors upon which the rule is supposed
to be based.
In these situations, the courts have made exceptions by seizing some
accepted head of equity jurisdiction and enjoining libel or slander as
an incident of it. The principal exception occurs in cases involving
interference with a plaintiff's business in such a manner as to constitute
unfair competition. There, equity will not hesitate to enjoin the defendant's acts, even though they constitute the publication of a libel or
slander.
One of the most common situations involving unfair competition is
that in which a defendant circulates to a plaintiff's customers letters or
circulars defamatory of the plaintiff's business. If such publications
merely advise a customer not to deal with the plaintiff, and leave him
free to make up his own mind, the libel will not be restrained.8 But,
if the defendant's representations threaten, coerce, or intimidate the
1
Paramount Pictures Inc. v. Leader Press Inc., 106 F. (2d) 229 (C. C. A.
10th, 1939). (The court relied upon the treatment of defamatory disparagement
of property in RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) §§626, 629).
'Francis v. Flinn, 118 U. S. 385, 6 Sup. Ct. 1148, 30 L. ed. 165 (1886);
Balliet v. Cassidy, 104 Fed. 704 (C. C. D. Ore. 1900) ; Robert E. Hicks Corp. v.
National Salesmen's Training Ass'n, 19 F. (2d) 963 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927);
Dehydro Inc. v. Tretolite Co., 53 F. (2d) 273 (N. D. Okla. 1931); Lietzman v.
Radio Broadcasting Station, 282 Ill. App. 203 (1935) ; Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 Mass. 69 (1873); William E. Whitehead v. Kitson, 119 Mass.
484 (1876); Covell v. Chadwick, 153 Mass 263 26 N. E. 856 (1891); Wolf v.
Harris, 267 Mo. 405, 184 S. W. 1139 (1916); Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige 24
(N. Y. 1839); Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, 171 N. Y. 384, 64 N. E. 163
(1902); DeWick v. Dobson, 18 App. Div. 399, 46 N. Y. Supp. 390 (2d Dep't
1897); Yood v. Daly, 37 Ohio App. 574, 174 N. E. 779 (1930).
'RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) §937, comment a. See Pound, Equitable Relief
Against Defamation (1916) 29 HARv. L. Rzv. 640.
'RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) §942, comment d.
'Id. §933(2), comment c.
OId. §943. comment b.
'Id. §942, comment d.
S'Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co.,
171 Fed. 553 (C. C. M. D. Ala. 1909) ; American Malting Co. v. Keitel, 209 Fed.
351 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913).
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customers or the public to the injury of the plaintiff's business, an
injunction will issue.' Similarly, where a conspiracy to destroy a plaintiff's business, as by boycott, is effected by means of libelous or slanderous publications, such publications will be enjoined.' 0 Recent decisions,
however, indicate that if the libel is pleaded, not as a libel, but as a
continuing damage to a business, the injunction will be allowed, 11 re2
gardless of unfair competition or conspiracy.'
A closely related situation is that in which the plaintiff asks an
injunction to restrain defendant from sending circulars or making
defamatory statements threatening plaintiff or his customers with suits
on the false ground that the plaintiff is infringing a patent or trademark of the defendant. These publications, if made under an honest
3
belief and with an intent to bring such suits, cannot be enjoined.'
However, if the defendant's representations are made in bad faith for
the purpose of injuring plaintiff's business, and amount to attempted
intimidation of the plaintiff's customers, by maliciously threatening them
with suits which the defendant has no intention of prosecuting, the
injunction will be granted. 14 Such bad faith may be shown by the
defendant's unreasonable delay in bringing the suit, 15 or by the bringing
of suit and the voluntary dismissal thereof. 16
' Beck v. Railway Teamsters Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13
(1898) ; see Willis v. O'Connell, 231 Fed. 1004, 1014 (S. D. Ala. 1916); Yood
v. Daly, 37 Ohio App. 574, 576, 174 N. E. 779 (1930).
" Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union, 45 Fed. 135 (C. C. S. D. Ohio
1891) ; Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Trade Comm., 13 F. (2d) 673 (C. C. A.
8th, 1926); Grand Rapids School Furniture Co. v. Haney School Furniture Co.,
92 Mich. 558, 52 N. W. 1009 (1892) ; cf. Gibraltar Savings Ass'n v. Isbell, 101
S. W. (2d) 1029 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
" Dehydro Inc. v. Tretolite Co., 53 F. (2d) 273 (N. D. Okla. 1931); Old
Investors & Traders Corp. v. Jenkins, 133 Misc. 213, 232 N. Y. Supp. 245 (Sup.
Ct. 1928) ; see (1938) 38 CoL. L. REv. 1291.
12 See Menard v. Houle, 11 N. E. (2d) 436, 437 (Mass. 1937).
"Kidd v. Horry, 28 Fed. 773 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1886) ; Kelley v. Ypsilanti
Dress-Stay Mfg. Co., 44 Fed. 19 (C. C. E. D. Mich. 1890); New York Filter Co.
v. Schwarzwalder, 58 Fed. 577 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1893) ; Welsbach Light Co v.
American Incandescent Lamp Co., 99 Fed. 501 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1899) ; Warren
Featherbone Co. v. Landauer, 151 Fed. 130 (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1903); Adriance
Platt & Co. v. National Harrow Co., 121 Fed. 827 (C. C. A. 2d, 1903) ; cf. Palmer
v. Travers, 20 Fed. 501 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1884).
" Emack v. Kane, 34 Fed. 46 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1888) ; Adriance Platt & Co.
v. National Harrow Co., 98 Fed. 118 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1899); A. B. Farquhar
Co. v. National Harrow Co., 102 Fed. 714 (C. C. A. 3d, 1900); Adriance Platt
& Co. v. National Harrow Co., 121 Fed. 827 (C. C. A. 2d, 1903) ; Racine Paper
Goods Co. v. Dittgen, 171 Fed. 631 (C. C. A. 7th, 1909) ; Electric Renovator Mfg.
Co. v. Vacuum Cleaner Co., 189 Fed. 754 (C. C. W. D. Pa. 1911) ; Atlas Underwear Co. v. Cooper Underwear Co., 210 Fed. 347 (E. D. Wis. 1913). But cf.
Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 Mass. 69 (1873); William E. Whitehead v. Kitson, 119 Mass. 484 (1876).
" Racine Paper Goods Co. v. Dittgen, 171 Fed. 631 (C. C. A. 7th, 1909);
Electric Renovator Mfg. Co. v. Vacuum Cleaner Co., 189 Fed. 764 (C. C. W. D.
Pa. 1911); Atlas Underwear Co. v. Cooper Underwear Co., 210 Fed. 347 (E. D.
Wis. 1913).
" Emack v. Kane, 34 Fed. 46 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1888) ; Adriance Platt & Co.
v. National Harrow Co., 121 Fed. 827 (C. C. A. 2d, 1903).
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Similarly, acting under the guise of repressing unfair competition,"
or under the power that equity has to prevent its decrees from becoming the instrumentalities of injustice,18 the courts will issue an injunction
in cases where there is a distribution of circulars misrepresenting the
scope or effect of a court's decree concerning patent rights, to the
detriment of the plaintiff's business. 19
Libelous publications inducing a breach of contract furnish another
principal exception to the general rule. So, where the defendant caused
the publication of matter allegedly injurious to plaintiff's business,
which contained, among other things, advice to the plaintiff's customers
20
not to perform their contracts, the entire publication was enjoined,
although the decree could have been limited to only that part of the
publication inducing the breach of contract. 21
In contrast to the American rule, English courts grant injunctions
against both personal and commercial defamation as such,22 but only
in cases where the publication is clearly tortious, 23 to wit: (1) where a

jury's verdict that the publication was not libelous would be set aside;24
(2) where there is no element of privilege ;25 and (3) where the court
20
is satisfied that the defendant cannot justify his acts.
The principal case swings to the English rule. It would be fortunate if American courts generally would follow this lead and enjoin
" Gerosa v. Apco Mfg. Co., 299 Fed. 19 (C. C. A. 1st, 1924) ; Price-Hollister
Co. "s
v.Asbestos
WarfordShingle,
Corp., 18Slate
F. (2d)
129 (S. D. N. v.Y. Johns-Mansville
1926).
& Sheathing Co.
Co., 189 Fed.
611 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1911); Rollman Mfg. Co. v. Universal Hardware Works,
238 Fed. 568 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916).
" Adjusta Co. v. Alma Mfg. Co., 36 F. (2d) 105 (S. D. N. Y. 1929) ; Gardner
Sign Co. v. Claude Neon Lights, 36 F. (2d) 827 (W. D. Pa. 1929); cf. Hobbs
Mfg. Co. v. Gooding, 113 Fed. 615 (C. C. A. 1st, 1902) ; Grand Rapids School
Furniture Co. v. Haney School Furniture Co., 92 Mich. 558, 52 N. W. 1009
(1892). See Hoover Co. v. Sesquicentennial Exhibition Ass'n, 26 F. (2d) 821, 822
(E. D. Pa. 1928).
20 American Malting Co. v. Keitel, 209 Fed. 351 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913).
21
Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power
Co., 171 Fed. 553 (C. C. M. D. Ala. 1909).
22 For a discussion of the English rule, see (1935) 80 L. J. 146. American
courts recognize the English position as based on statute. See Kidd v. Horry, 28
Fed. 773, 774 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1886) ; A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Joseph Hol-

lander, Inc., 117 N. J. Eq. 578, 583, 177 Atl. 80, 82 (1935).

But see Pound,

Equitable Relief Against Defamation (1916) 29 HARv. L. REv. 640 at 665, in which
Dean Pound states that the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 and the Judicature Act of 1873 afford very little foundation for the extension of jurisdiction.
He says the real reason was the desire of the judges "to put equitable relief
against
defamation on a sound basis".
22
James v. James, 13 L. R. Eq. 421 (1872); Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v.
Massan, 14 Ch. D. 763 (1880); Thomas v. Williams, 14 Ch. D. 864 (1880); Herman Loog v. Bean, 26 Ch. D. 306 (1884); Hayward v. Hayward, 34 Ch. D. 198
(1887); Walter v. Ashton, [1902] 2 Ch. 282.
24 Coulson v. Coulson, 3 T. L. R. 846 (1887).
-5 Quartz Hill Consol. Gold Mining Co. v. Beall, 20 Ch. D. 501 (1882).
20
Bonnard v. Perryman, [1891] 2 Ch. 269.
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clearly libelous publications simply because they are defamatory, without regard to their incidental connection with other tortious conduct, or
to subterfuges in pleading. The extent to which such libelous publications are actually enjoined under the exceptions mentioned casts doubt
upon the significance of the factors which are supposed to justify the
rule that equity will not enjoin a libel or slander.2 7 In these commercial
cases the interest to be protected is not one of personality but a substantial interest in property. The right of freedom of speech should not
serve as a shield for tortious harm to private interests. The lack of
issues of fact makes jury trial unnecessary. And the problems of
drafting and enforcing the decree seem not to have been insurmountable.
J. B. CHESHIRE, IV.
Liability Insurance-Successive Insurers-Apportionment of LossApplicability of Fire and Marine Insurance Principles.
Libellant ship owner was insured against loss arising from liability
for damage to cargo' under two similar policies with different insurers,
one policy expiring, and the other becoming effective, in the middle of
the voyage. As a result of negligent stowage, a shipment of tobacco
was, unknown to the libellant, damaged by moisture and heat, 26% of
the damage occurring, according to one witness, during the period covered by the first policy, and 74% during the period covered by the
second policy. After having settled the claims of the owners of the
tobacco, the libellant sued the two insurers to recover the amount paid.
2
The district court held the first insurer liable for the entire amount,
while the circuit court of appeals, one judge dissenting, apportioned
the loss between the two insurers according to testimony as to the
amount of damage which had been done to the cargo during the time
that each policy was in force.3
As a general premise it may be said that unless the event insured
against, whatever it may be, occurs during the term of the policy, the
2'7
See notes 2-7, supra. ,See Artloom Corp. v. National Better Business Bureau
Inc., 48 F. (2d) 897, 898 (S. D. N. Y. 1931).
1The

contracts provided that the insurers were to

"...

make good to the

Assured . . . all such loss and/or damage and/or expense, as the Assured, without their privity or knowledge, shall . . . have become liable to pay . . . on
account of the liabilities, risks, events and/or happenings herein set forth ... "
One of the categories enumerated was: "(8) Liability for loss of, or damage to
•... cargo . . . to be carried, carried, or which has been carried on board the vessel named herein:.. . "' Brief for Libellants-Appellees-Appellants, p. 3, Export
Steamship Corp. v. American Ins. Co., 106 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
'Export Steamship Corp. v. American Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 79 (S. D. N. Y.

1938).
Export Steamship Corp. v. American Ins. Co., 106 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 2d,
1939).
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insurer will not be liable. 4 In the principal case the insured event was
loss arising from liability. In a sense, there was no loss until the
insured carrier paid damages to the shipper; but the courts do not give
such a narrow interpretation to these contracts,5 and all the judges
considering this case agreed that the loss was to be regarded as complete when the liability accrued. 6 The insured event, then, being loss
by accrual of liability, and the injury causing the loss being a continuing one operating constantly to increase the loss over a considerable
period beginning before, and ending after, the expiration of the policy
in question, it becomes necessary to determine how much of the accrual of liability is to be ascribed to the term of the policy.
The court divided on the question as to when the liability accrued.
The majority opinion took the position that the accrual of liability on
the facts presented was a gradual matter, and that as the damage to
the tobacco increased day by day, so did the liability of the shipowners.
This would mean that, although the first indication of damage would
make the insured liable to the extent of that damage, further damage
would raise a new and greater liability. 7 Since some of the liability
accrual in the principal case occurred during the term of one insurer
and some during the term of another, it may be said that the shipper's
loss, the insured event, occurred during the terms of both. It would
seem, then, following the general premise with which we started, that
the loss should be apportioned.
The dissenting opinion, however, took the view that once the tobacco showed any -damage at all, the shipowners then became liable,
and that all subsequent damage was merely the inevitable result or
consequence of the original negligence which caused the first damage,
'Kelly, Dempsey Co. v. Century Indemnity Co., 77 F. (2d) 85 (1935) ; Tulare
County Power Co. v. Pacific Surety Co., 43 Cal. App. 315, 185 P. 399 (1919);
Coit v. Smith, 3 Johns. Cas. 16 (N. Y. 1802); Duncan v. Great Western Ins.
Co., 1 Abb. App. Dec. 562 (N. Y. 1867), aff'g Crosby v. New York Mutual Ins.
Co., 5 Bos. 369 (N. Y. 1859); Howell v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 44 N. Y.
276 (1871); Howell v. Protection Ins. Co., 7 Ohio 284 (1835); Lockyer v.
Offley, 1 Term Rep. 252 (K. B. 1786); Hare' v. Travis, 7 B. & C. 14 (K. B.
1827) ; Knight v. Faith, 15 Q. B. 649 (1850).
' There is a difference between a "liability" policy of insurance and an "indemnity" policy. The former insures against liability and does not call for payment of a judgment as a condition precedent to recovery from the insurer,
whereas the indemnity contract is one which only insures against loss, and the
judgment must be paid before recovery can be had. Boney v. Central Mutual
Ins. Co. of Chicago, 213 N. C. 470, 196 S. E. 837 (1938); VANCE, LAW Or INSURANCE (1930) 682-684; note (1926) 41 A. L. R. 509.
'"We take it that in a time policy insuring against loss arising from legal
liability, the insurer is bound to make the insured whole on losses due to liabilities
that accrued against the insured during the term covered by the policy." Export
Steamship
Corp. v. American Ins. Co., 106 F. (2d) 9, 10, 12 (C.C. A. 2d, 1939).
T Cf. Hare v. Travis, 7
B. & C. 14 (K. B. 1827) (cargo of pearl ashes damaged from water shipped due to heavy seas, damage occurring over period of
time).
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so that the whole of the accumulated liability should be regarded as
having occurred at the inception of the accumulation. 8
The court in the principal case was, no doubt, handicapped in its
opinion by an extreme paucity of cases on the precise point in question.
The problem was further complicated by the existence of two successive insurers, a situation which seems to have arisen so seldom in any
field of insurance as to make it practically a. new point. As a result of
this lack of authority, the court was driven, as was the dissenting judge,
to draw analogies from the cases in other fields of insurance, such as
fire, accident, and marine. The life insurance cases do not present the
problem involved in the principal case since the fact on which payment
by the insurer depends is the occurrence of the death of the insured,
which happens at one moment of time and cannot extend over a length
of time.9
The property loss cases may be divided on their facts into two
classes, similar to the court's division in the principal case as to the
time of accrual of liability-those where the cause of loss specified in
the contract of insurance is a "momentary" cause, setting forces in
operation, and all subsequent events which may be considered loss insured by the policy are merely the proximate results of the "momentary" operation of this cause; and those where the cause insured
against continues over a period of time, no insured loss resulting until
the property insured comes in contact with this "continuing" cause,
the cause and the loss thus being concurrent.
In collision, explosion, and certain types of marine insurance the
insured event is damage or loss resulting from the occurrence of these
causal events.' 0 In any such insurance contract the specified cause of
the loss insured against is "momentary"."' It may be that, upon the
' Cf. Corporation of the Royal Exchange Assurance v. United States, 75 F.
(2d) 478 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) (insurance against liability for non-delivery held
matured when delivery became impossible, although amount of damage could not
be determined at that time).
' See Howell v. The Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 44 N. Y. 276, 277 (1871).
"0The British Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 EDW. VII, c. 41, §1 defines a
contract of marine insurance as

".

. . a contract whereby the insurer undertakes

to indemnify the assured, in manner and to the extent thereby agreed, against
marine losses.

. . ."

The term is usually limited by dates or by the duration of

the voyage. See PATTERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE (1932), Appendices D and E.
"Accident insurance, including workmen's compensation insurance, should
fall in this category. In this type of insurance, however, the insured event is the
accident, rather than the loss resulting therefrom-that is, the time limit of the

policy applies to the occurrence of the accident, the company agreeing to pay
for all proximate results. A typical policy reads: "One (a) to pay promptly to
any person entitled thereto under the Workmen's Compensation Law ...the
entire amount of any sum due, and all installments thereof as they become due.
...Seven. This agreement shall apply only to such injuries so sustained by

reason of accidents occurring during the policy period." The case of Treadwell v.
Columbia Casualty Co., 167 So. 103 (La. App. 1936), arose under a statutory
policy similar in terms to that just quoted. The court in Phillips v. Holmes
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termination of such a risk, damage not yet suffered is, practically
speaking, inevitable as a result of the occurrence of the specified momentary cause of loss. 12 This situation has given rise to the "death
wound" rule of marine insurance, that if a ship receives its death wound
during the term of the policy and is subsequently lost after the policy
expires, the loss will be treated as occurring during the term of the
insurance, since it was practically inevitable that total loss should result
from the death wound.13 The element of inevitability must be present,
however. 14 This rule is based on a legal fiction that an inevitable "damage begun is a damage done".' 5 Its theory is that if the damage which
ultimately results may be treated as inevitable, it can be said to have
occurred at the time of its inception, thereby satisfying all the time
elements of the insurance contract.' 0
In cases where property is insured against fire, tornado, hail, storms,
etc., the insured event is damage or loss due to the operation of the
cause insured against. 17 But here the factual situation is slightly different. The cause in this case is "continuing", and there is, in fact, no
actual damage of any part of the property until it has come in contact
with the particular force insured against.' 8 This being the case, if the
fire or whatever the insured cause is, extends beyond the period of the
insurance, not only has the term expired before part of the loss itself
occurred, but even before the cause of that part of the loss has occurred, which was not the situation in the marine insurance cases reExpress Co., 229 N. Y. 527, 129 N. E. 901 (1920), reached a similar result,

probably also because of the terms of the policy which are not given. Cf.
v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 256 N. Y. 146, 175 N. E. 654 (1931).
Anderson
1. Corporation of the Royal Exchange Assurance
v. United States, 75 F. (2d)
478 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cited supra note 8; 5 CoucH, CYcLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE
LAW (1929) 1213.
1
* Coit v. Smith, 3 Johns. Cas. 16 (N. Y. 1802); Duncan v. Great Western
Ins. Co., 1 Abb. App. Dec. 562 (N. Y. 1867), affg Crosby v. New York Mutual

Ins. Co., 5 Bos. 369 (N. Y. 1859) ; Shawe v. Felton, 2 East 109 (K. B. 1801) ;
see Knight v. Faith, 15 Q. B. 649, 660 (1850) for discussion of the case history
of the rule; 1 PHILLiPS, LAW OF INSURANCE (3d ed. 1853), 684, 686; 7 CoucH,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW (1929) §§1699, 1700. Contra: Howell v. Protection
Ins. Co., 7 Ohio 284 (1835).
15 5 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW (1929) §1213.

Rochester German Ins. Co. v. Peaslee-Gaulbert Co., 120 Ky. 752, 767, 87
S. W. 1115, 1119 (1905).
1"

So long as the cause begins and ends during the policy period and damage

starts, this insured cause need not be strictly "momentary", but may continue over

a period of time, the treatment of the events subsequent to the cessation of the
effective or original cause being the same as if it had operated all at one moment

of time.

" The New York and North Carolina Standard Fire Policies insure against
"all Direct Loss and Damage by Fire" during a stated term. N. Y. INs. LAW
§121;8 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §6437.
Cf. Liverpool, London & Globe Ins. Co. v. McFadden, 170 Fed. 179 (C. C. A.
3d, 1909) (insurance against loss of cotton by fire, and during fire cotton prices
rose, held, the time for valuing the cotton was when the fire reached and consumed it).
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ferred to above. But as a practical matter, once the cause starts to
operate, it is an impossibility to bring it under complete control so as
to stop the resulting damage at will. The results are, therefore, practically inevitable. For this reason the rule applied in such cases, most
frequently found in the fire insurance field, is adapted from the marine
insurance rule.1 9 It apparently is not necessary for the proximate results to be in fact inevitable, the rule being that once a fire starts, since
the subsequent loss is practically inevitable the insurer on the risk at
20
the time will be liable for the entire damage if it is a continuous fire,
21
although some of the fire may occur after the end of the term.
It is submitted that the application of these rules does violence not
only to the facts of the case, but likewise to the terms of the insurance
contract. Perhaps not so much violence is done in the "momentary"
cause cases as is true in the "continuing" cause classification, for the
reason that in the former the two facts determinative of liability have
occurred during the term-that is, the cause of loss has been completed
and loss, the insured event, has started; but in the latter, not only has
part of the loss, the insured event, not yet occurred, but also part of the
cause has yet to take direct effect. Looking at the contract, if the time
limit applies only to the occurrence of the casual event, as possibly in
the case of accident insurance,2 2 then if that has transpired completely
during the term, the insurer might reasonably be held liable for all the
proximate results. If, however, the insured event is merely the occurrence of loss, it is certainly a violation of the terms of the contract to
hold the insurer for loss occurring outside of the period, even though
the occurrence of the cause before the policy term would make no difference.23 If the time limit applies to both cause and loss, the insurer's
liability would seem to be even more limited. Certainly, in no case
should the insurer be held liable for loss due to a cause which operated
after the term, although that is what is done in the "continuing" cause
cases, on the basis of an assumed inevitability, which, as a matter of
fact, usually exists.
(1905) 17 GREEN BAG 674.

s0 Saul v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 79 Pa. Super. 322 (1922) (liability of
insurer dependent on question whether second fire was continuation of first, the
policy having attached after the first but before the second fire).
2Fred J. Kiesel & Co. v. Sun Ins. Co. of London, 88 Fed. 243 (C. C. A.
8th, 1898); Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. David Moffat Co., 154 Fed. 13
(C. C. A. 2d; 1907) ; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Doll, 23 F. (2d) 443 (C. C, A.
7th, 1928); Davis v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 158 Cal. 766, 112 Pac. 549 (1910) ;
Rochester German Ins. Co. v. Peaslee-Gaulbert Co., 120 Ky. 752, 87 S. W. 1115
(1905); Wiig v. Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 100 Neb. 271, 159 N. W. 416,
L. R. A. 1917F 1061 (1916); VANCE, LAW oF INsURANCE (1930) 699. In these
cases "practical" inevitability has been present, and the problem of its absence
'has therefore not been squarely settled.
2 See note 11, supra.
"Tulare County Power Co. v. Pacific Surety Co., 43 Cal. App. 315, 185 P.
399 (1919).
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In all the cases from which these rules have been drawn, the horns
of the dilemma on which the court found itself were either to soak the
insurer for the whole loss on the grounds of an actual or assumed inevitability, or to apportion the loss between the insurer and the insured
24
It
on the basis of the facts as applied to the contract, or vice versa.
would be wasted, ink to say which way the court jumped. True, in the
"death wound" rule, if the loss subsequent to the policy was not reasonably inevitable, the insurer would not be soaked, but even with the balm
of "inevitability" the strict terms of the contract are transgressed. The
need for doing this was not the logic of the case, for it is clearly a
violation of the general premise on which this note is based, but was
rather the desire to give the insured all the benefit possible from his
insurance contract. The ideal situation for presenting the problem, uncomplicated by this sympathy with the insured, would, of course, be
that of successive insurers, the time limit of the policy applying only
to occurrence of loss. Whether the courts in such a case presented in
the fire or marine fields would allow apportionment of the loss, thus
following the contract, is open to question, but there is no apparent
reason why they should not.
In the instant case there are successive insurers, a situation which
has not been treated in the property loss cases. It would seem that, by
analogy to the above reasoning, the logical and fair outcome would be
apportionment, since this would apparently be in accord with the terms
of the contract, assuming the liability to have accrued gradually.2 5 The
ony objections which might be made would probably be lack of certainty
of the rule,20 and difficulty of apportionment. 27 As for lack of certainty and difficulty of apportionment, it would seem that if justice
2But cf. Plecity v. Geo. McLachlan Hat Co., 116 Conn. 216, 164 At. 707
(1933) (workmen's compensation case, cause of injury being mercurial poisoning

due to conditions of employment which extended over a period of time, held,
both insurers liable for full amount of compensation, rights of contribution between them being postponed for future litigation).
- The question of when the liability accrued could have been avoided by the
court by taking the view that accrual merely shows the time at which the cause
of the loss occurs, and that the insurer is not insuring against accrual of liability,
but against loss arising from such accrual, whenever that accrual may occur. It
might be said that the only situation where such an ephemeral concept as liability
could be the sfibject of insurance would be where there is a prearranged value
set on the occurrence of it, such value to be paid to the insured when the "state"
arises. The loss, under this view, is indicated by the facts which show loss, not
by the legal interpretation of the word "accrual", and if some of these facts occur
during the-term of one insurer, and some during the term of another, the loss,
following the contract strictly, should be apportioned.
"See Howell v. Protection Ins. Co., 7 Ohio 284, 287 (835); Lockyer v.
Ofley, 1 Term Rep. 252, 259 (K. B. 1786) ("it is of more consequence that
the rule be certain than whether it is established one way or the other").
2 There was much difference of opinion in the present case as to just how
much damage had been done during the term of each insurer, all but two of the
witnesses refusing to make an estimate because of the uncertainty involved. Export Steamship Corp. v. American Ins. Co., 160 F. (2d) 9, 13 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
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is best served by an uncertain and difficult rule, it should be so served.
However, why such a rule in the case of successive insurers should
be uncertain is hard to see. There is no reason why an insurer should
not become liable the moment his policy attaches, 28 other than that to
be found in the terms of the policy itself, the operation of the cause
prior to the policy certainly being no objection.
It would seem, then, that the court, although having no direct
authority to go on, reached a sound result in the principal case, from
the view of the logic of the case before it as well as the probable outcome of similar cases in the analogous property field.
SAMUEL R. LEAGER.
Master and Servant-Storekeepers--Liability for Assaults by
Servants Not Acting within Scope of Employment.
The plaintiff, a customer of the defendant store, remonstrated with
an employee of the store in regard to language used by the employee
to one of the girls employed in the store, whereupon the employee told
the plaintiff to follow him, and they went out the back door and there
the employee assaulted him. The North Carolina Supreme Court, reversed the lower court's judgment for plaintiff and held that the assault
was made for reasons purely .personal to the employee and unconnected
with the employer's business, and, therefore, that the doctrine of
respondeat superior did not apply and defendant was not liable. Justice
Seawell dissented, suggesting that the defendant in this case should be
subjected to the same rule of liability as that imposed on railroads2 for
injuries inflicted on persons dealing with them as patrons. It is this
suggestion that is discussed in this note.
Although in the case of unintended injuries to passengers common
carriers are liable only if they failed to exercise a high degree of care, 3
2

8 Id.

at 719.

Robinson v.. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 216 N. C. 322, 4 S. E. (2d) 889 (1939).
- Justice Seawell further states that the rule applies to municipalities, relying
upon the following, quotation from Munich v. Durham, 181 N. C. 188, 194, 106
S. E. 665, 668 (1921) : "The carrier owes to the passenger the duty of protecting
him from violence and assaults of other passengers and intruders, and will be
responsible for his own or his servants' negligence in this particular, when by the
exercise of proper card the acts of violence might have been foreseen and prevented ....
The same rule applies to any other corporation." This may be dictum,
for the assault -was said to have been committed by the employee while acting
within the scope of his employment. Furthermore, the quotation here would seem
to indicate that the employers' responsibility is the exercise of care rather than
that he be absolutely liable for injuries inflicted by his employees.
Henson v. Fidelity & Columbia, Trust Co., 68 F. (2d) 144 (C. C. A. 6th,
1933) ; Suttle v. Southern Ry., 150 N. C. 668, 67 S. E. 778 (1909) ; Kearney v.
Seaboard Air Line Ry., 158 N. C. 521, 74 S. E. 593 (1912) ; Hughes v. Pittsburgh
Transportation Co., 300 Pa. 55, 150 At. 153 (1930); Bosworth v. Union R. R.,
26 R. J. 309, 59 Atl. 982 (1904); Scales v. Boynton Cab Co., 198 Wis. 293, 223
N. W. 836 (1929); note (1939) 17 N. C. L. REv. 453.
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in the case of injuries intentionally inflicted by an employee of the carrier
the great weight of authority is that the carrier is absolutely liable; and
it is immaterial that the employee is acting beyond the scope of his employment. 4 This doctrine is not applied solely to railroads, but to other
public service corporations as well.' In Dunn v. Western Union Telegraph Co.B the company was held liable for insulting and abusive language used by one of its employees toward a person entering the
premises for the purpose of sending a telegram. The court intimated
that the same result would be reached in the case of any public service
company. The rationale seened to be that the patron's right of respectful treatment, while attempting to do business with a public service
company, follows as a natural sequence from the right to be served
impartially.
This absolute liability is explained in a number of ways. With regard to carriers, the most generally accepted argument is that passengers
contract not only for transportation, but also for good treatment and
"... against personal rudeness and any wanton interference with their
persons, either by the carrier or his agents ... and for the fulfillment
of these obligations the carrier is liable [whether breach be by] . . .
principal or his employees." This statement is found in the early case
of Pendleton v. Kinsley,7 and is the view adopted by the North Carolina
court in the case of White v. Norfolk & Southern R. R. 8 Furthermore, as expressed in the Dunn case, the government demands that all
public service companies act impartially toward all. It is considered
that they are under obligation to extend their facilities to all persons,
and, in so doing, these institutions shall afford ". . . safe and decent
access to the places opened up for the transaction of the business in
question."9
In substance, Justice Seawell suggests that the law applicable to public utilities, as exemplified by the carrier and telegraph company cases,
' Savannah, F. & W. Ry. v. Quo, 103 Ga. 125, 29 S.E. 607 (1897) ; Garvik v.
Burlington, C. . & N. R. Ry., 131 Iowa 415, 108 N. W. 327 (1906) (an employee
raped a passenger); White v. Norfolk & Southern R. R., 115 N. C. 631, 20 S. E.

191 (1894); Williams v. Gill, 122 N. C. 967, 29 S. E. 879 (1898); 'Strother v.
Aberdeen & Ashboro R. R., 123 N. C. 197, 31 S.E. 386 (1898) (insulting remark
by an employee).
'.Taxi Companies: Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 241 U. S.
252, 36 Sup. Ct. 583, 60 L. ed. 984 (1916) ; Yellow Cab Co. v. Carmichael, 33 Ga.
App. 364, 126 S. E. 269 (1925) ;.Reitz v. Yellow Cab Co., 248 Ill. App. 287 (1928) ;
Shelton Taxi Co. v. Bowling, 244 Ky. 817, 51 S.W. (2d) 468 (1932) ; Hogan v.
Miller, 156 Va. 166, 157 S.E. 540 (1931). Sleeping and Parlor Car companies:
Campbell v. Pullman Palace-Car Co., 42 Fed. 484 (C. C. N. D. Iowa 1890).
'2 Ga. App. 845, 59 S.E. 189 (1907).
719 Fed. Cas. No. 10,922 (C. C. D. R.. I. 1870).
8 115 N. C. 631, 20 S.E. 191 (1894).
'Dunn v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 2 Ga. App. 845, 850, 59 S.E. 189,
191 (1907).
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be extended to other enterprises which serve the public. Why should
not the same rule be applied to stores, innkeepers, banks, and other such
enterprises ?
Stores owe their existence, as do public utilities, to the patronage
they seek from the public, and though they are not required to serve
the entire public, as a practical matter there is but little, if any, discrimination exercised by most storekeepers in the selection of their
customers. It may be argued, therefore, that despite the difference in
legal status between these two types of business enterprise, the changing
economic need of the public and the changing business policy of the
storekeepers require an enlargement of the degree of liability to invitees and an extension to them of absolute protection from assaults of
an employee of the serving principal. A case may be found to the
effect that when one enters a public place, such as a saloon, the proprietor is bound to see that he is properly protected from assaults; and
the court in that case imposed liability upon the proprietor without
making any apparent distinction between the cases where the injury is
inflicted by an employee and the cases where the injury is inflicted by
a fellow customer.' 0 Furthermore, the early New York case of Mallach
v. Ridley" furnishes the following, which is directly in support of Justice
Seawell's suggestion:
"It was long held by the courts that a common carrier was not responsible for a willful assault by one of its employees upon a passenger.
This rule, however, has been abrogated upon the theory that the common carrier invites the passenger to subject himself to the protection
and care of the employe of the corporation, and under these circumstances the common carriers should be responsible for all the acts of the
subordinates towards the passenger while under his custody and control.
"In like manner, the store keeper invites the public to enter his
premises, and to subject themselves to the custody and control of his
subordinates, and by parity of reasoning he should be held responsible
for the brutalities of such subordinates, even where they are not committed within the strict line of his employment. There seems to be no
distinction in principle between the cases."
The majority of the cases, however, seem to limit the duty of proprietors of stores and like enterprises to an exercise of reasonable care
2o Rommel v. Schambacher, 120 Pa. 579, 11 Ati. 779 (1887). The presence of
the defendant at the time 'when the injury occurred and his failure to take due
precaution to protect the plaintiff undoubtedly was relied upon by the court in

imposing liability. This factor and the vagueness of the court's opinion make it
difficult to derive from the case the exact type of duty sought to be imposed upon

the defendant in situations of this nature. Accord: Clancy v. Barker, 71 Neb. 83.

98 N. W. 440 (1904) (hotel); Mayo Hotel Co. v. Danciger, 143 Okla. 196, 288
Pac.1 309
(1930).
N. C. 172, 181, 9 N. Y. Supp. 922, 923 (1st Dep't 1888).
24 Abb.
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toward the protection of the invitee from injury while on the premises.12
In the case of Sswinarton v. Le Boutillier,3 although the New York
court cited the Mallach case, it was held that the storekeeper owed the
plaintiff. only a duty to use reasonable care in protecting him from the
misconduct of his servants, and was not subject to the rule of absolute
liability which is applied in the public utility cases. Nor can it be said
that there is a contract, either express or implied, that the storekeeper
will be absolutely liable for the acts of his servant when the servant
exceeds the scope of his authority. The liability depends upon whether
the master was negligent, either in the employment or retention of an
unfit servant,1 4 or whether, after he knew that a tort was about' to be
committed, the master failed to take measures to prevent it. 15
Although it is evident that there is need, from the plaintiff's standpoint, at least, for a broader basis for liability than the doctrine of
respondeat superior, which may often be inadequate in cases of this
nature, it would be inequitable to storekeepers if the duty imposed upon
them consisted of more than the requirement that they use reasonable
care in the selection and retention of servants, and that they refrain
from putting the customers in. a position where it is likely that a tort
will occur. If absolute liability for injuries inflicted by employees and
the requirement of the exercise of a high degree of care to prevent injuries by fellow patrons is imposed upon storekeepers in general, as
upon carriers, this would no doubt be subject to great abuse.
HAL HAMMER WALKER.
Clancy v. Barker, 131 Fed. 161 (C. C. A. 8th, 1904) (where opposite result
was reached on same set of facts as in Clancy v. Barker, cited supra note 10) ;
Duckworth v. Appostalis, 208 Fed. 936 (E. D. Tenn. 1913) ; Rahmel v. Lehndorff,
142 Cal. 681, 76 Pac. 659 (1904) ; Ledington v. Williams, 257 Ky. 599, 78 S. W.
(2d) 790 (1935).
3 7 Misc. 639, 28 N. Y. Supp. (N. Y. City Cts. 1894).
"'Duckworth v. Appostalis, 208 Fed. 936 (E. D. Tenn. 1913); Rahmel v.
Lehndorff, 142 Cal. 681, 76 Pac. 659 (1904); Fairbanks v. Boston Storage Warehouse Co., 189 Mass. 419, 75 N. E. 737 (1905) ; Smothers v. Welch, 310 Mo. 144,
274 S. W. 678 (1925); Priest v. Woolworth Five & Ten Cent Store, 228 Mo.
App. 23, 62 S. W. (2d) 926 (1933) ; Cobb v. Simon, 119 Wis. 597, 97 N. W. 276
(1903).
" Molloy v. Coletti, 114 Misc. 177, 186 N. Y. Supp. 730 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (proprietor of restaurant held liable to plaintiff for an assault on him by disorderly
third person after proprietor had been -warned of the presence of the person) ; Gurren v. Casperson, 147 Wash. 257, 265 Pac. 472 (1928) (injury to plaintiff by an
intoxicated guest in hotel, after innkeeper had been asked for protection).
12

